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Chapter 1  Past Stock Returns and Option Prices  
1.1 Introduction 
 
Standard option pricing models, such as the Black-Scholes model and the binomial 
option pricing model, assume that capital markets are perfect, underlying stock 
returns follow a martingale diffusion process and option payoffs can be readily 
replicated by using the underlying stocks and risk-free assets. Consequently, options 
can be treated as redundant securities. Therefore, stock options are priced by 
disallowing arbitrage opportunities. More specifically, standard option pricing models 
predict that only six factors enter into the option pricing formulas, that is, the 
underlying stock price, the strike price, risk-free rate, volatility, maturity and 
dividends paid on the underlying stock. Other factors, such as the investor’s 
expectation about future stock returns and their preferences about higher moments of 
the underlying stock return distribution, do not matter for option pricing.  
 
This paper tests the prediction of standard option pricing models that there should be 
no relation between past stock returns and stock option prices. The motivation for our 
paper is straightforward: when the perfect capital market assumption is relaxed, it 
may become difficult to replicate option payoffs1 (Evnine and Rudd (1995), Figlewski 
(1989), Canina and Figlewski (1993)). As a result, options can become non-redundant 
securities (Figlewski (1989), Figlewski and Webb (1993), and Grossman (1995)).
                                                        
1 There are a number of reasons why this is the case. For example, buying and selling stocks and 
options in real world are subject to transaction costs; volatility of the underlying is not known but has 
to be estimated; borrowing rate is not equal to lending rate for typical arbitrageurs; they also have to 








Prices of non-redundant securities are then determined both by the limited arbitrages 
and by demand and supply for options. This opens up the possibilities that other 
factors could enter into option pricing.  
 
In this paper we focus exclusively on one candidate factor: return predictability and 
examines thoroughly its implications for option pricing. Using the individual stock 
options data, we show that puts are significantly overvalued relative to calls after 
large stock prices increases and calls are significantly overvalued relative to puts after 
large stock prices decreases. We show that such valuation effects are both 
economically and statistically significant. More importantly, we argue that it is the 
autocorrelation structure of the individual stock returns that drives this valuation 
effect. Overall, our results suggest that past stock returns exert an important influence 
on individual stock option prices.  
 
Our paper is linked to two separate strands of literature. The first one is the literature 
about stock return predictability2. We’d like to emphasize that the major difference 
between the voluminous return predictability literature and our paper is that our 
intention here is not to answer such questions as what kind of predictors can we 
employ or is the return predictability real or just an artifact of data. Instead, we want 
to examine the implication of return predictability (or alternatively, past stock returns 
given return predictability) on stock option prices. In imperfect capital markets, past 
stock returns can affect option prices through a number of different channels. First, 
past stock returns can affect investor’s expectation about future stock returns given 
return predictability. It has been documented that individual stock returns are 
negatively autocorrelated (Lo and MacKinlay (1988, 1990)). Hence, if past stock 
returns are strongly positive, negative autocorrelation suggests that future stock 
returns are projected to be below average. Investors can exploit this expectation by 
buying put options on the underlying stock, thereby creating an upward pressure on 
                                                        









put prices. Similarly, if past returns are strongly negative, negative autocorrelation 
suggests that future stock returns will be above average. Investors can also exploit this 
expectation by buying call options on the underlying stock, thereby creating an 
upward pressure on call prices.  
 
Second, past stock returns can affect option prices through investors’ risk aversion and 
portfolio insurance considerations. Risk aversion suggests that investors’ exposure to 
stock prices can depend on recent stock price movements, which then affects their 
demand and supply for calls and puts. An easy way of changing their exposure to the 
stock price movements is by buying call and put options on the underlying stock. If, 
after stock prices have risen, a greater proportion of investors demand increased 
exposure to equities, they can purchase call options on the underlying stock, thereby 
creating upward pressure on call prices, which will rise in this case to increase the 
supply of call writers. If on the other hand, stock prices have fallen, a greater 
proportion of investors demand decreased exposure to stock prices, they can purchase 
put options on the underlying stock, thereby creating upward pressure on put prices, 
which will rise in this case to increase of out writers.  
 
Third, past stock returns can change investor’s expectations about the higher moments 
of the underlying stock return distributions. If investors care about these higher 
moments3, then their demand and supply for calls and puts will change as their 
expectations about these higher moments change. Once again, given return 
predictability, past stock returns can change investor’s skewness and kurtosis 
expectations.  
 
Our paper is also closely related to the literature about the reflections into the standard 
option pricing models in the case of either incomplete markets (Figlewski (1989)) or 
                                                        
3 It has been established in asset pricing literature that investors do care about these higher moments. 









other market frictions (Lo and Wang (1995). Our paper falls into this category in the 
sense that we investigate option pricing in the situations where stock returns are 
predictable4 . However, despite the huge literature about return predictability and 
option pricing respectively, the relation between past stock returns and option prices 
has not been thoroughly examined before. The only exception as far as we know, is 
Amin et al. (2004), where they examine the implication of stock market momentum 
on option prices at index option level. Using the OEX option (S&P 100 index options) 
data, they have shown OEX calls are significantly overvalued relative to OEX puts 
after large stock price increases and OEX puts are significantly overvalued relative to 
OEX calls after large stock price decreases. Their conclusion is that past stock market 
returns exert an important influence on index option prices. The novelty of our paper 
is that we extend their analysis from index options to individual stock options. There 
are at least two motivations why this extension might be interesting and important.  
 
First, it has been established that portfolio (index) returns are strongly positively 
autocorrelated while individual stock returns are negatively autocorrelated. While the 
result of Amin et. al (2004) is thought-provoking, it leaves one important question 
unanswered: Does the autocorrelation structure or risk aversion drive their result? 
Given that index and individual stocks have the opposite autocorrelation structure, 
extending their analysis from index option to individual stock options can help us 
answer this question. If autocorrelation structure is the underlying and fundamental 
driving force, we would expect to see exactly the opposite results in the case of 
individual stock options. That’s, call options will be significantly undervalued relative 
to put options after large stock price increases and put options will be significantly 
undervalued relative to call options after large stock price decreases. We confirm this 
projection in our empirical tests. 
                                                        
4 We want to point out that since our interest is to examine the implications of individual stock returns 
on option prices, we mainly focus on short-horizon return predictability in this paper. More specifically, 
we focus on returns over the past 5 days, though we replicate our tests using returns over the past 7 and 









Second, by extending the analysis from index options to individual stock options, we 
can further look at the cross sections of individual stock options. It has been 
established in market microstructure literature that large stock returns lead small stock 
returns due to more frequent trading of large stocks and more quick incorporation of 
new information in large stocks as opposed to small stocks. Given this cross sectional 
return predictability, investors can also exploit their expectations of future small stock 
returns by jointly taking into account past large stock returns and lead-lag relationship 
between large and small stock returns. This lead-lag relationship, while absent from 
research at index option level, may interact with the above autocorrelation structure in 
such a way that important implications for option pricing can be further identified and 
investor patterns can be better studied.  
 
While these two motivations look different at first glance, the underlying logic 
remains the same. In the case of index versus individual stock options, we focus on 
the return predictability along the time series dimension while in the case of large 
versus small stocks, we focus on return predictability along the cross sectional 
dimension. The fundamental predictions of this return predictability hypothesis 
remain the same. That is, return predictability, either along the time series dimension, 
or along the cross sectional dimension, can have important impact on option prices. 
Due to space limit, we focus on the first motivation in this paper.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we provide details on data 
and methodology we use in this paper; Section 3 contains our non-parametric tests of 
the boundary conditions violations. We perform our parametric tests of volatility 









1.2 Data and Methodology 
1.2.1 Data 
The option trades and quotes data we use in this study come from Berkeley Options 
Databases (BODB). BODB covers all the option trades and quotes that took place in 
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) from Dec 1979 to Dec 1995. For each 
trade, BODB records the option’s type (call or put), the transaction price, strike price, 
maturity, trading volume and the contemporaneous price of the underlying stocks. The 
Berkeley transaction database contains a number of data entry errors, especially in its 
early years. These errors mainly involve the miscoding of the underlying price. We 
corrected these errors by checking the recorded underlying stock price with the prices 
from CRSP5. We also delete all transactions with missing or negative option prices. In 
addition, all transactions where option prices below their intrinsic values are also 
deleted. The reason is that later on we need to compute the implied volatility 
estimates for each option trade in our sample. The implied volatility estimates for the 
transactions where option prices are below their intrinsic values are simply 
meaningless.  
 
Since BODB is essentially a transaction database, we cannot afford to examine all the 
stocks with options trading on them. Instead, we select five stocks based on the 
number of options trades in Dec 1995. Table 1.1 contains the detailed information for 
these five selected stocks. We want to emphasize that all these five selected stocks are 
well-established firms, which provides us the additional advantage that they are less 
subject to stale prices and they pay quarterly dividends regularly within our sample 
period. This greatly facilitates our empirical tests.  
 
The daily stock returns come from the daily stock returns files that are available from 
                                                        
5 We find that these miscoded underlying stock prices are easily to detect. So we apply the following 
simple price filters: for any record, if the absolute deviation of the recorded underlying price from the 








CRSP. When we examine the boundary conditions violations, we need to compute the 
present value of strike prices and dividends. We use the risk-free rates that come from 
the Fama-French risk-free rate files also available from CRSP. We focus on regularly 
quarterly dividends for these selected stocks, the information of which is also 
available from CRSP. Following standard practice in the literature, we assume that 
investors know these dividends on the underlying stocks in advance. The realized 
dividends are used to compute the present value of dividends during the life of each 
option.   
1.2.2 Methodology 
Similar to Amin et al. (2004), our methodology in this paper also consists of two 
different sets of tests. The first set of tests, which are non-parametric, are mainly 
about the violations for American put-call parity boundary conditions. More 
specifically, we examine whether the put-call parity boundary conditions for 
American options are systematically violated more frequently after stock price 
increases or decreases. These relations are completely model independent. The 
purpose of this non-parametric test is that, if systematic violations of these arbitrage 
bounds as a function of past stock returns exist, this suggests strong evidence of 
systematic pricing pressures on calls and puts. As we have argued in the introduction 
part, return predictability hypothesis would predict that given negative autocorrelation, 
strongly positive past stock returns lead to violations of the American put-call 
boundary conditions by increasing put option prices. Strongly negative past stock 
returns lead to violations of the American put-call boundary conditions by increasing 
the call option prices. Therefore, if investors significantly bid up put prices after large 
stock price increases, the probability of put price run-ups should be higher during 
periods after large stock price increases than during periods after large stock price 
decreases. Similarly, following large stock price declines, call prices should be 
relatively high, increasing the probability of call price run-ups.  
 








sources of price distortions. There are a number of reasons why this set of tests is 
necessary. First, the non-parametric tests we perform examine only the boundary 
conditions. Given that these boundary conditions and their violations come in the 
form of inequalities, we are essentially restricting ourselves to extreme observations 
in our sample. We’d like to find our whether pricing pressures on option prices occur 
in general or only in extreme situations. Second, we’d like to know whether the return 
predictability hypothesis continues to hold for parametric specifications of option 
pricing. Most importantly, we’d like to quantify the magnitude and separate the 
sources of price distortions, as suggested by the non-parametric tests.  
 
To implement this test, we measure the overpricing of calls relative to puts by the 
difference between their implied volatilities, or volatility spread. Implied volatility is 
now a widely accepted paradigm for empirical tests of option valuation (Jarrow and 
Wiggins (1989)). The motivation of using volatility spread as a measure for option 
pricing distortion is as follows: under perfect market conditions and for a given 
maturity date, the volatility implicit in call prices must be equal to the volatility 
implicit in put prices. On the other hand, higher call-implied volatilities relative to 
put-implied volatilities indicate that calls are overpriced relative to puts. Therefore, 
we can measure the relative overpricing or underpricing of call and put options by 
their implied volatilities6.  
 
Throughout our implementation of this parametric test, we adopt binomial option 
pricing model to estimate the implied volatilities and thus construct the volatility 
spread measure. By going to binomial option pricing model implied volatilities, we 
give up the model independency of the non-parametric tests. However, by examining 
implied volatilities, we can now quantify and relate the effects of price distortions to 
previously established biases of the standard option pricing model. More specifically, 
                                                        
6 A similar procedure has been adopted by Figlewski and Webb (1993) to investigate the pricing 
pressures in options market as a function of short interest. Therefore, we are not the first one to 








we show that the volatility spread increases after stock price decreases and decreases 
after stock price increases. Therefore, put options are relatively overpriced 
immediately following large stock prices increases and call options are relatively 
overpriced immediately following large stock price decreases. We also show that 
these effects are not affected when we control for moneyness and maturity effects in 
the implied volatilities.  
1.3 Boundary Condition Tests Based on Put-Call Parity  
for American Options 
1.3.1 American Put-Call Parity Boundary Conditions  
We first investigate whether the put-call parity boundary conditions for American 
options are systematically violated as a function of past stock returns. The absence of 
arbitrage opportunities implies the following boundary conditions must hold for 
American options for a strike price and maturity date:  
 
1 ( ) 0
2 ( ) 0
B Callprice Putprice Stockprice PV strikeprice
B Putprice Callprice Stockprice PV dividends Strikeprice
= − − + ≤
= − + − − ≤ , 
where PV is the present value operator and dividends corresponds to the dividends 
paid on the underlying stock during the remaining life of the options.  
 
Suppose the first boundary condition (B1) is violated, then a typical arbitrageur can 
make a riskless arbitrage profit by buying the put, settling the call, buying the 
underlying stock and borrowing the present value of the strike price. This strategy will 
yield an initial positive cash inflow equal to the amount of boundary violations. In the 
future, there will be no cash outflows. In contrast, suppose the second boundary 
condition (B2) is violated, then again a typical arbitrageur can a riskless arbitrage 
profit by buying the call, settling the put, shorting the underlying stock and lending 
the strike price and the present value of the dividends. This strategy will yield an 








no future cash outflows7.  
 
An important caveat for these boundary condition tests is that in imperfect capital 
markets, these boundary conditions can never be perfected tested using the transaction 
data due to various market frictions as we have argued in the introduction. Our goal 
here is not to argue that there are unexploited arbitrage opportunities. Instead, we 
want to identify the pricing pressures on call and put options 8 . Our return 
predictability hypothesis predicts that if investors significantly bid up put prices after 
large stock price increases, then the probability that B1 is greater than zero (a 
violation) should be higher during periods after large stock price increases than during 
periods after large stock price decreases. Similarly, the probability of B2 is greater 
than zero (a violation) should be higher during periods after large stock price 
decreases than during periods after large stock price increases.  
 
For American put-call parity boundary condition violations, the value of the 
underlying stock must be identical when the call and put options trade. To identify 
put-call pairs with identical underlying stock price, we take each day of call and put 
trades and conduct a combined sort by strike price, maturity, underlying stock price 
and time of the day. We then select from this any put-call pair that appears 
consecutively within the sort. This way we would be extracting only pairs with 
identical contract specifications and underlying stock prices. To ensure that our first-
traded price is relatively fresh, we also require that no more than 10 minutes pass 
when the first-option trade is observed and the second-matching-option trade is 
observed. Otherwise, we delete the option trade and conclude that no matching trade 
was acknowledged.  
                                                        
7  For brevity, we refer the readers to Jarrow and Rudd (1983) for a detailed discussion of the 
construction and proof of these two boundary conditions.  
8  The absence of arbitrage opportunities implies that B1 and B2 should be negative for every 








1.3.2 Boundary Conditional Violation Tests 
Table 1.1 shows the characteristics of the options for the five selected stocks we have 
included for our boundary conditions violation tests. Our overall sample periods and 
the total number of matched call-put pairs vary across the five selected stock options. 
Both call and put prices increases as maturity increases from less than 1 month to 
more than 3 months. We also compute the number of matched option pair trades per 
day. With the exception of TXN options, short-term maturity options trade most 
frequently, and trading volume almost falls uniformly with maturity. In addition, since 
long maturity options trade less frequently, it becomes more difficult to match them 
based on the underlying stock prices, which leads to a sharp decrease in matched 
volume.  
 
Table 1.2 reports the probability of boundary condition violations and the average 
value of violations conditional on a violation, as a function of the past 5-day stock 
returns for each of the five selected stocks. The probability of boundary condition 
violations (that is Prob(B1>0)) is computed as the number of observations of B1 for 
which B1 is positive divided by the number of total observations of B1. The past 5-
day stock returns are computed using the daily stock returns. Boundary conditions are 
evaluated on date t, while the past stock returns are computed from date t-1 to t-5. 
This one-day window facilitates the potential implementability of our strategy and 
thus makes our tests realistic9. In Table 1.2, we report the results for the entire sample 
period. Later, we replicate our tests for pre-and post crash sub-sample analysis. The 
reason for this pre-and post-crash period analysis is that we suspect the 1987 stock 
market crash would result in unreliable option prices due to liquidity problems. We’d 
like to find out whether the results hold for these two sub-samples. In table 1.2a, we 
focus on the pre-crash period whereas in Table 1.2b, we focus on the post-crash 
period after eliminating the 3-month period immediately following the crash. Since 
the main results are quantitatively the same, we will focus on Table 1.2a for brevity 
                                                        
9 We also experimented with computing returns from day t-2 to t-6. Our results are not affected by the 










Table 1.2 shows the average values of B1 and B2, the probability of boundary 
condition violations and the dollar magnitude of the violations for the entire sample 
period. Our results suggest that the average values of B1 and B2, the probability of 
boundary condition violations and the dollar magnitude all depend on past stock 
returns. First, there is a negative relation between past stock returns and the mean 
value of B1 and a positive relation between past stock returns and the mean value of 
B2 for four out of the five stock options10. When past returns increase from -5% to 
5%, the mean value of B1 decreases by $0.06, $0.04, $0.28 and $0.14 and the mean 
value of B2 increases by $0.20, $0.02, $0.03 and $0.34 for GM, HWP, MRK and 
TXN options respectively. In contrast, the mean value of B1 increases from -0.96 to -
0.87 and the mean value of B2 -0.60 to -1.02 as past returns move from -5% to 5% for 
IBM options; Second, the relation between past stock returns and probability 
conditions violations is especially strong. An increase in past stock returns from -5% 
to 5% causes the probability of B1 violations to decrease by 54%, 34%, 70% and 37% 
and the probability of B2 violations to increase by 181%, 88%, 32% and 89% for GM, 
HWP, MRK and TXN options respectively. In contrast, the probability of B1 
violations increases from 0.05 to 0.09 and the probability of B2 violations decreases 
from 0.19 to 0.06 as past returns move from -5% to 5% for IBM options. Conditional 
on a B1 violation, the magnitude of the arbitrage violation is about $0.4, $0.3, $0.23, 
$0.18 and $0.29 for GM, HWP, IBM, MRK and TXN options respectively. Given an 
average option price of $2.8, $3.2, $3.1 and $5.9, these mispricings represent 14%, 
9%, 7%, 6% and 5% of the average option price for GM, HWP, IBM, MRK and TXN 
options respectively. Conditional on a B2 violation, the magnitude of the arbitrage 
violation is about $0.2, $0.17, $0.14, $0.22 and $0.28 for GM, HWP, IBM, MRK and 
TXN options respectively. Given an average option price of $2.8, $3.2, $3.8, $3.1 and 
                                                        
10 IBM options stand out as an “anomaly” at first glance. However, as we’ll argue later, this is exactly 
evidence that autocorrelation structure drives the relation between B1 and B2 boundary condition 








$5.9, these mispricings represent 7%, 5%, 4%, 7% and 5% of the average option price 
respectively for GM, HWP, IBM, MRK and TXN options respectively. Therefore, our 
results suggest that the magnitude of these arbitrage violations is economically 
significant.  
 
To get a clearer picture for the entire range rather than the specific categories of the 
past returns, we plot the relation between past 5-day stock returns and the probability 
of boundary condition violations after grouping the past stock returns into percentiles 
in Figure 1-1. Again, past stock returns are calculated from day -1 to -5. Visual 
examination of Figure 1-1 shows with an exception of IBM options, there is a strong 
negative relation between B1 violations and past stock returns for the entire range of 
past stock returns. Similarly, Figure 1.1b suggests there is a strong positive relation 
between past stock returns and B2 violations. In contrast, there is a strong positive 
relation between past returns and B1 violations and a negative relation between past 
returns and B2 violations. Hence, our evidence in Table 1.2 cannot be attributed to a 
particular grouping scheme.  
 
An interesting question to ask is that why the observed pattern between past stock 
returns and probability of B1 and B2 boundary condition violations are different from 
IBM options as opposed to the other four options. A partial answer is provided in 
Table 1.3, where we compute the first-order autocorrelation for individual stock 
returns during our sample period for each of the five selected stocks. We also compute 
the first-order autocorrelation for NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ equally-weighted index 
returns. As we can see from Table 1.3, similar to the index returns, IBM stock returns 
are positively autocorrelated over the short horizon we have examined in our tests. In 
contrast, the other four stock returns are negatively autocorrelated during our sample 
period. Combined with the fact that return predictability hypothesis predicts that given 
negative (positive) autocorrelation for individual stock returns, investors project 
future stock returns to be below (above) average if past stock returns are strongly 








following large stock price decreases (increases), our results in Table 1.2 is totally 
consistent with the prediction of this hypothesis.  
 
Our results so far provide initial support for the return predictability hypothesis. The 
fact that more violations occur as a function of past stock returns is significant but 
informal. To formally test the relation between past stock returns and the boundary 
conditions violations, we further perform a two-way classification Chi-square test11. 
The purpose of this test is twofold: first, we’d like to demonstrate that results in Table 
1.2 are not due to outliers when few options are trading. Second, the Chi-square test 
formalizes the informal information presented in Table 1.2 without imposing any 
structure on the relationship.  
 
Our Chi-square tests again focus on each matched option trade. Table 1.4 provides the 
results for these Chi-square tests. The null hypothesis that there is no association 
between past stock returns and the boundary condition violations is rejected at all 
conventional significance level, as judged by the resulted Chi-square test statistics. 
Our evidence suggests that the relation between past stock returns and boundary 
conditions violations is statistically significant. When past stock returns are negative, 
violations of B1 are more likely relative to their expected number if there was no 
relationship between past stock returns and B1 violations. When past stock returns are 
positive, violations of B2 are more likely. While not shown in Table 1.4, results are 
also significant for both the precrash and postcrash subsamples.  
 
We also examine whether the boundary conditions violations are meaningful after 
taking into account one type of transaction costs. To test this idea, we require that 
purchase transaction take place at the market maker’s ask price, and sale transactions 
take place at market maker’s bid price. This way, investors pay the bid-ask spreads in 
the options markets before they realize any arbitrage profits. Take B1 violations as an 
                                                        








example. If B1 is violated, then a typical arbitrageur can execute the arbitrage 
portfolio strategy of buying the put option and sell the call option. Taking transaction 
costs into account in this case, we record the put price at the market maker’s ask price 
and record the call price at the market maker’s bid price. Essentially this approach 
penalizes any arbitrage strategy by the bid-ask spread. A violation is found if either 
B1 or B2 is positive after incorporating the bid-ask spread. As shown in Table 1.4, our 
results continue to hold after taking into account the bid-ask spreads. Even after 
paying the bid-ask spread, violations of the boundary conditions are related to past 
stock returns. These findings suggest that our results are not only statistically 
significant but also economically significant.  
 
1.4 Implied Volatility and Past Stock Returns 
While the evidence presented so far are convincing, it leaves several important 
questions unanswered. First, the return predictability hypothesis does not require 
boundary violations. By investigating only the boundary violations, we are restricted 
to extreme observations in our sample. We’d like to find out whether the pricing 
pressure on option occurs in general or only in extreme situations. Second, our tests in 
Table 1.2 and Table 1.4 focus mainly on the probability of boundary conditions 
violations and ignore the magnitude of these violations. We’d like to find out whether 
the dollar magnitude of the B1 and B2 violations are also affected by past stock 
returns. Third, we’d like to find out whether the return predictability hypothesis 
continues to hold for parametric specification of option pricing. Most importantly, we 
are interested in quantifying the magnitude of the price distortions and separate the 
sources of these price distortions.  
 
To answer these questions, we formulate an additional parametric approach as an 
important supplement to the non-parametric tests. We employ call and put-implied 
volatility as a measure for the pricing pressures in options markets. Similar to Harvey 








compute the implied volatility estimates. We assume that dividend paid on the 
underlying stock is known in advance. The advantage of binomial option pricing 
model is that it can easily take into account the fact that these options are American 
options subject to early exercise.  
 
1.4.1 Implied Volatility Estimates 
Using the Newton-Raphson search procedure similar to the one suggested by 
Manaster and Koehler (1982), we calculate the implied volatility for every transaction 
in our sample. More specifically, the following algorithm is employed: given an ith 
estimate implied volatility, the procedure suggests the i+1th should be: 
*
1








Where ( )iC σ is the price of the option with an implied volatility of iσ  computed from 
the binomial model, 
*( )C σ  is the observed option price and vega is the partial 
derivative of the option price with respect to volatility. We iterate on this procedure 
until the implied volatility has converged and the predicted price is equal to the 
market price12.  
 
As we have argued in the introduction, we use the volatility spread, defined as the call 
minus put-implied volatility as the measure for price distortions. The advantage of 
using this measure is that we can now quantify the magnitude and separate the source 
of the price distortions as suggested by Table 1.2 and Table 1.4. A caveat is in order, 
though. Previous literature has established that option pricing models systematically 
misprices options with respect to maturity and moneyness (Whaley (1982), Stein 
                                                        
12 We divide days to maturity into 180 intervals. The convergence criterion is set to 0.001%. That is, the 
algorithm is considered convergent if the estimated price is within 0.001% of the observed price. 
Ideally, the number of intervals should be dependent on the length of the days to maturity. However, 
there is a tradeoff in terms of computation cost. We compare our estimates to the estimates we obtain 
from Black-Scholes when the underlying stock pays no dividends before expiration. They are very 








(1989) and Bakshi et al. (1997)). More specifically, short-term options are typically 
underpriced by Black-Scholes relative to long-term options. Similarly, deep in-the-
money option and deep-out-of-the-money options are underpriced relative to at-the-
money options. Hence, we need to control for option moneyness and maturity when 
we employ the volatility spread measure and examine the relation between implied 
volatilities and past stock returns.  
 
In Table1.5 we show the implied volatilities of call and put options as a function of 
past 5-day stock returns separated by strike price and maturity. Panel A shows the 
call- implied volatilities when past 5-day stock returns are positive (greater than 0.05), 
and panel B shows the call-implied volatilities when past 5-day stock returns are 
negative (less than -0.05). A decline in stock prices increases call-implied volatilities 
regardless of the maturity and strike price. On average, as past stock returns move 
from -5% to 5%, the call-implied volatilities increase by 3.0, 1.8, 4.1, 2.6 and 5.5 
percentage points for GM, HWP, IBM, MRK and TXN options respectively. Negative 
stock returns increase implied volatilities estimates across the board, while affecting 
the short-maturity options (1 month or less), deep-out-of-the-money and deep-in-the-
money options the most. In contrast, long-maturity and at-the-money options are 
affected to a smaller extent.  
 
Similar patterns are identified for the put options (Panel C and Panel D of Table 1.5). 
A shift from increasing to decreasing stock prices increases the put-implied volatilities 
by 1.9, 0.2, 3.6, 5.7 and 1.4 percentage points for GM, HWP, IBM, MRK and TXN 
options respectively. In addition, all implied volatility estimates increase with 
decreasing stock prices. Once again, the most pronounced volatility increases are 
observed in short-maturity options (1 month or less), deep-out-of-the-money and 
deep-in-the-money options. Declines in stock prices increase both call and put implied 
volatilities. However, call-implied volatilities increase more than put-implied 
volatilities for four out of the five selected stock options. Given a decrease in stock 








options. Given an increase in stock prices, investors bid up the relative prices of put 
options above those of the call options. These patterns again are consistent with the 
return predictability hypothesis.  
 
While the above results provides initial evidence that call and put implied volatilities 
respond differently to past stock returns, we focus on the overall volatility spread to 
precisely quantify this differential response. As discussed earlier, we need to control 
for moneyness and maturity since our results could be potentially biased if certain 
strike prices and maturities trade more on one side of the spread than the other due to 
maturity or term structure effect. To achieve this goal, we match options according to 
maturity and moneyness13. We then randomly throw out any excess calls and puts at 
each maturity and moneyness level. In this way, our implied volatility spread is 
computed from a set of call and put transaction identically matched in terms of 
maturity, moneyness and number.  
 
1.4.2 Four Weighting-Schemes for Implied Volatility Spreads 
Each day, for the given set of calls and puts, we compute the implied volatility spread 
in four different ways. The purpose of this exercise is to examine the sensitivity of 
various options to the return predictability hypothesis and ensure that our results are 
general. We first weight each option-implied volatility equally, averaging across all 
call and put volatilities and taking the difference, resulting in an equally weighted 
estimate of the volatility spread. Second, we compute vega-weighted volatility spread. 
This weighting scheme takes a weighted average of all call and put volatilities based 
on the partial derivative of each option’s price with respect to the volatility. This 
scheme weights at-the-money options more than out-of-the-money options. If at-the-
money options are not affected by past stock returns, then there should be little or no 
                                                        
13 To match on moneyness, we create a variable indicating how far in or out of the money the option’s 
strike price is at the beginning of the day. Options between 0 and 5% in the money receive a 
moneyness indicator of 1, those 0 and 5% out of the money receive a moneyness indicator of -1, those 








relation between past stock returns and vega-weighted average spreads. The third 
measure is the elasticity-weighted volatility spread, which weights by the elasticity of 
each option with respect to the value of the underlying stock price level. This 
weighting scheme is similar to Chiras and Manaster (1978) and Franks and Schwartz 
(1991) and incorporates leverage constraint. Since elasticity is a decreasing function 
of how much the option is in the money, this procedure weights out-of-the-money 
options more than in-the-money options. Our final weighting scheme uses only at-the-
money options only. This scheme is used by Harvey and Whaley (1991) and 
Figlewski and Webb (1993). At-the-money options are defined as the call-put pairs 
with strike price immediately bracketing the underlying stock prices prior to option 
trade. Available options are weighted equally within strike price then interpolated 
based on their distance from the opening underlying stock price level. The difference 
between call and put measures is referred to as the at-the-money implied volatility 
spread. This scheme usually throws away a lot of option data.  
 
Table 1.6 presents summary statistics for the volatility spreads averaged for each 
trading day for each of the four weighting schemes. Several observations are in order. 
First, typically, the mean and median weighted-average volatility spread is small and 
negative, on the order of 4%. Negative estimates indicate that put-implied volatilities 
exceed call-implied volatilities. Second, standard deviations of the volatility spreads 
tend to be between 4% and 9% for each of the five selected stock options. Also, 80% 
of the volatility spreads fall between -1% and 1%.  
 
Table 1.6 also presents the partial autocorrelation coefficients for average daily 
volatility spreads. All four series exhibit significantly positive partial autocorrelations. 
Most of the first-order partial autocorrelations for all weighting schemes are above 0.5. 
Some are even as high as 0.9. The large positive first-order autocorrelation suggests 
that implied volatility spreads follow a slow-moving diffusion process. This finding is 
again consistent with a situation where the innovations in volatility spread (and hence 








either call or put options. The positive serial autocorrelation makes it less likely that 
the volatility spread arises from either temporary measurement errors or asynchronous 
trading between options market and the underlying stock market. The slow-moving 
nature of the volatility spreads is well taken into account in our subsequent time-series 
regressions.  
 
Table 1.7 provides the cross-correlations of the volatility spread by weighting type for 
the five selected stock options. Our four weighting schemes produce estimates that are 
highly correlated. Given the high degree of correlation among our four measure of 
volatility spread, we are not likely to get vastly different estimates using each of these 
measures. In our subsequent analysis, we focus on the volatility spread calculated 
using elasticity weighting. The main advantage for using this measure is that it utilizes 
all options and incorporates the leverage constraints.  
 
1.4.3 Volatility Spread Tests 
The relation between past stock returns and volatility spread is examined in Table 1.8. 
The return predictability hypothesis predicts a negative relation between past stock 
returns and volatility spreads in the presence of negative autocorrelation of stock 
returns and a positive relation between past stock returns and volatility spread in the 
presence of positive autocorrelation of stock returns. Past stock returns are computed 
using the returns over the past 5 days. Once again, we leave a 1-day separation 
between the ending day for computing stock returns and the calculation of the 
volatility spread. This 1-day window ensures that potential investors can have the 
necessary information at hand to actually implement our tests.  
 
The slow-moving nature of the volatility spread series suggest that if daily average 
spreads are used as the dependent variables in ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions, the regression residuals will exhibit strong autocorrelations, leading to 








autoregressive error model eliminates the correlation structure of the residuals, as 
judged by the Box-Pierce statistics.  
 
1.4.4 Alternative Hypothesis Tests 
So far we have established that past stock returns affect option prices. Given a 
negative autocorrelation, positive past stock returns increase the prices of put options 
whereas negative past stock returns increase the prices of call options. Both price 
changes lead to boundary condition violations that are inconsistent with frictionless 
and no-arbitrage market. There are a number of potential interpretations of our 
findings. In this section, we attempt to distinguish among them.  
 
The first possible explanation for the results documented so far is the return 
predictability hypothesis we’ve been testing. Return predictability hypothesis predicts 
that in the presence of negative autocorrelation for individual stock returns, if past 
stock returns are negative, investors will expect the future stock returns to be above 
average. Consequently, they will significantly bid up the prices of call options; if past 
stock returns are positive, investors will expect the future stock returns to be below 
average. Consequently, they will significantly bid up the prices of put options. On the 
other hand, if stock returns are positively autocorrelated, the above arguments would 
be reversed and we will expect prices of puts to increase following strongly negative 
past stock returns and prices of calls to increase following strongly positive past stock 
returns. In any case, the return predictability hypothesis predicts that past stock 
returns exert an independent influence on the volatility spread. As we have argued, the 
results in Table 1.8 is consistent with this return predictability hypothesis.  
 
A second explanation for our findings can be that past stock returns are just proxies 
for an omitted variable that affects call and put prices differently. Literature suggests 
an ideal candidate for such an omitted variable is volatility (Schewert (1989)), where 








volatility falls. This idea predicts that if a separate estimate of volatility is included as 
a regressor in Table 1.8, it would show up with a negative coefficient and drive away 
the significance of the past stock returns.  
 
Another possibility is that investors’ demand and supply for options depend not only 
on their expectations of future stock returns but also on their portfolio insurance and 
risk aversion considerations, and both effects are present. The risk aversion hypothesis 
predicts that when the volatility of stock returns increases, an increased number of 
investors demand less exposure to the stock market and bid up the prices of put 
options; when the volatility of stock returns decreases, an increased number of 
investors demand greater exposure to the stock market and bid up the prices of call 
options. This idea suggests that if a separate estimate of the volatility is included as a 
regressor in Table 1.8, it would show up with a negative coefficient but would not 
necessarily drive away the significance of the past stock returns. Both past stock 
returns and volatility can show up with significance influences.  
 
Furthermore, we can extend the above idea into higher moments of the stock return 
distributions in a similar fashion. If investors care about these higher moments and 
their expectations of higher moments are based on changes in past stock returns, then 
option prices can be affected. Past literature suggests that both stock returns are right 
skewed and investors have a preference for right skewness. Holding all else constant, 
if investors expect an increase in right skewness, they will bid up prices of call 
options relative to put options. This idea suggests a positive relation between changes 
in skewness and volatility spread.  
 
Finally, the kurtosis measure captures the probability of extreme events from the 
volatility measure when stock returns are not normally distributed. However, since the 
kurtosis measure affects both the left and right tails of stock returns distributions there 
is no ex ante prediction of a sign of the relation between kurtosis and the volatility 








estimation procedure.  
 
We test these ideas with a regression analysis using past stock returns, expectation 
about volatility, skewness and kurtosis as independent variables. We estimated a four-
equation joint system using Generalize Methods of Moments (GMM) to take into 
account potential heteroscedasticity issues. To estimate the future expectations about 
volatility, skewness and kurtosis, we fit an AR(5) model for each of these variables. 
We use the elasticity-weighted volatility spread as of Table 1.8. The historical stock 
return volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of realized returns. Skewness 
and kurtosis measures are estimated similarly.  
 
The results in Table 1.9 indicate that for 4 out of the 5 selected stock options, past 
stock returns continue to show up with predicted signs as in Table 1.7. Including 
higher moments of stock return distributions does not eliminate the predicted relation 
between past stock returns and volatility spread. This finding suggests that investor’s 
expectation of future stock returns directly affect their valuation of stock options 
independent of other channels of influence.  
 
Table 1.9 also suggests that past returns do not act as a proxy variable for higher 
moments of stock returns such as volatility. More importantly, the return predictability 
hypothesis is not rejected even when we control for other factors. When past stock 
returns are positive, investors’ demand for put options increases, exerting upward 
pressures on put prices. Similarly, when past stock returns are negative, investors’ 




Our results suggest that in the presence of market frictions, past stock returns exert a 








for individual stock returns is the underlying and fundamental driving force for this 
valuation effect. This finding is contrary to the prediction of standard option pricing 
models. We also find that previously documented biases in option pricing models, 
which result in volatility smiles, are also strongly influenced by past stock returns. 
Since our findings can exist in markets where perfect arbitrage is not possible due to 
market frictions, our evidence suggests that no-arbitrage based option pricing models 
leave considerable room for disagreement about equilibrium option values.  
 
Our findings are important for several reasons. First, this is the first study to 
empirically document the influence of past returns on option prices at the individual 
stock level. Second, our results are general and do not depend on any particular option 
pricing models. Third, given that the effect of past stock returns on option prices is 
model independent, it is impossible to account for this effect through any no-arbitrage 
based option pricing models.  
 
Our findings have a number of implications. First, our evidence suggests that the 
pricing pressure of past stock returns is strong enough to result in systematic 
boundary condition violations, which are independent of any particular option pricing 
model. Consequently, our findings suggest that efforts to account for the observed 
biases in option prices through no-arbitrage-based option pricing models are not likely 
to be successful. Second, our findings indicate that it would be worthwhile to examine 
how taking into account past stock returns affects various biases that have been 
documented in different option pricing models (Bakshi, Cao and Chen (1997)). Third, 
given that implied volatility is widely in finance literature 14 , our findings 
demonstrating the systematic variation in implied volatilities of calls and puts as a 
function of past stock returns can also be used to improve the quality of the implied 
                                                        
14 For example, implied volatility is used to explore arbitrage opportunities (Manaster and Rendleman 
(1982)), to proxy the market’s volatility (Schwert (1989, 1990), Canina and Figlewski (1993), and 
Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1993), or to measure the market’s risk premia (Merton (1980), Poterba and 








volatility estimates used for these purposes. Finally, our findings have important 
investment implications. Following large stock price decreases, bets on further stock 
price increases are more expensive to implement using call options. Hence, investors 
wanting to place such bets may be better off using the futures contracts or underlying 
stocks. Conversely, following large stock price decreases, certain strategies such as 
































Table 1.1 Distribution for Five Selected Stock Options Call-Put Pairs Matched on Time, 
Stock Price, Maturity and Strike Price 
 















Panel A. GM Options: Dec 3 1979 through Dec 29 1995 
1-29 2260 $1.68 $1.38 55628 24.6 234 
30-59 2406 3.01 2.24 71570 29.7 240 
60-89 1351 3.75 2.90 43425 32.1 190 
90 and more 3497 4.47 3.52 50647 14.5 266 
All Options 3988 3.15 2.45 221270 55.5 497 
Panel B. HWP Options: May 30 1980 through Dec 29 1995 
1-29 2131 2.41 1.74 33458 15.70 169 
30-59 1935 3.64 2.62 28153 14.55 172 
60-89 1026 4.74 2.97 21282 20.74 172 
90 and more 2223 5.41 3.42 19149 8.61 134 
All Options 3733 3.81 2.55 102042 27.34 277 
Panel C: IBM Option: Dec 3, 1979 to Dec 29, 1995 
1-29 2830 2.87 2.16 456713 161.38 710 
30-59 2924 4.51 3.31 290562 99.37 833 
60-89 1445 6.09 3.98 149268 103.30 541 
90 and more 3880 7.14 4.82 158192 40.77 502 
All Options 3986 4.39 3.11 1054735 264.61 1459 
Panel D: MRK Options: Jul 20 1981 through Dec 29 1995 
1-29 1916 2.65 2.04 20341 10.6 127 
30-59 2044 3.64 2.82 15996 7.8 107 
60-89 1118 4.45 3.18 6807 6.1 50 
90 and more 2048 4.43 3.32 10382 5.1 85 
All Options 3426 3.52 2.67 53526 15.6 248 
Panel E: TXN Options: Jan 2 1981 through Dec 29 1995 
1-29 2031 $3.95 3.22 28497 14.0 267 
30-59 835 6.33 5.52 23763 28.5 289 
60-89 473 8.99 7.03 17235 36.4 222 
90 and more 92 9.71 7.82 8875 96.5 112 



















Table 1.2  Put-Call Parity And Stock Option Boundary Conditions Tests based on Past 5-


















Panel A: GM Options 
All Data 221270 -1.043 0.056 0.399 -0.669 0.109 0.200 
R<-0.15 86 -1.722 0.116 1.122 -0.635 0.302 0.851 
R<-0.1 1769 -0.811 0.063 0.174 -0.929 0.023 0.420 
R<-0.05 16713 -1.037 0.074 0.176 -0.823 0.059 0.155 
R>0.05 29819 -1.099 0.034 3.206 -0.622 0.166 0.210 
R>0.1 4159 -1.104 0.029 0.316 -0.224 0.351 0.228 
R>0.15 1188 -0.892 0.022 0.221 -0.216 0.314 0.196 
Panel B: HWP Options 
All Data 102042 -0.460 0.107 0.301 -0.505 0.131 0.171 
R<-0.15 574 -0.223 0.289 0.328 -0.539 0.120 0.310 
R<-0.1 1264 -0.289 0.210 0.224 -0.574 0.047 0.389 
R<-0.05 12745 -0.393 0.131 0.126 -0.550 0.092 0.141 
R>0.05 16664 -0.433 0.087 1.282 -0.527 0.173 0.186 
R>0.1 3088 -0.542 0.091 0.319 -0.474 0.169 0.189 
R>0.15 1549 -0.661 0.072 0.208 -0.437 0.114 0.301 
Panel C: IBM Options 
All Data 1054735 -0.965 0.064 0.232 -0.771 0.105 0.145 
R<-0.15 2089 -0.311 0.097 0.198 -0.327 0.273 0.085 
R<-0.1 3537 -0.613 0.043 0.326 -0.476 0.268 0.112 
R<-0.05 52218 -0.962 0.054 0.143 -0.604 0.194 0.134 
R>0.05 85283 -0.872 0.092 0.182 -1.018 0.062 0.144 
R>0.1 3928 -1.141 0.053 0.244 -1.420 0.032 0.149 
Panel D: MRK Options 
All Data 53526 -0.516 0.157 0.181 -0.603 0.101 0.222 
R<-0.15 3 -11.218 0.000 0.635 6.973 0.333 11.604 
R<-0.1 252 -0.871 0.333 0.232 -1.032 0.119 0.657 
R<-0.05 4307 -0.373 0.256 0.168 -0.664 0.084 0.348 
R>0.05 5510 -0.649 0.075 0.101 -0.630 0.111 0.193 
R>0.1 695 -0.781 0.033 0.635 -0.383 0.157 0.206 
Panel E: TXN Options 
All Data 78370 -1.081 0.093 0.286 -1.028 0.124 0.275 
R<-0.15 1898 -0.936 0.098 0.480 -1.290 0.066 0.540 
R<-0.1 1586 -0.991 0.204 0.294 -1.094 0.129 0.907 
R<-0.05 9629 -1.038 0.123 0.247 -1.219 0.083 0.231 
R>0.05 12048 -1.174 0.078 0.318 -0.877 0.157 0.240 
R>0.1 2314 -1.090 0.100 0.249 -0.937 0.152 0.323 













Table 1.2a: Put-Call Parity And Stock Option Boundary Conditions Tests based 



















Panel A: GM Options 
All Data 166167 -1.248 0.032 0.823 -0.783 0.106 0.223 
R<-0.1 899 -1.176 0.018 0.248 -1.344 0.012 0.893 
R<-0.05 11876 -1.330 0.039 0.323 -1.012 0.054 0.183 
R>0.05 21965 -1.329 0.020 7.518 -0.761 0.157 0.240 
R>0.1 2699 -1.505 0.011 1.028 -0.219 0.423 0.256 
R>0.15 937 -1.037 0.017 0.313 -0.217 0.343 0.211 
Panel B: HWP Options 
All Data 76843 -0.549 0.074 0.455 -0.576 0.122 0.187 
R<-0.15 281 -0.277 0.263 0.103 -0.687 0.007 0.066 
R<-0.1 793 -0.334 0.203 0.301 -0.694 0.015 1.342 
R<-0.05 9794 -0.466 0.094 0.127 -0.612 0.086 0.144 
R>0.05 13030 -0.487 0.071 1.956 -0.616 0.157 0.202 
R>0.1 2589 -0.610 0.077 0.315 -0.515 0.165 0.207 
R>0.15 1150 -0.779 0.061 0.253 -0.513 0.078 0.432 
Panel C: IBM Options 
All Data 627010 -1.235 0.065 0.317 -0.996 0.073 0.226 
R<-0.05 22325 -1.461 0.965 0.268 -0.847 0.163 0.186 
R>0.05 51005 -1.131 0.096 0.238 -1.363 0.028 0.289 
R>0.1 2551 -1.472 0.056 0.309 -1.872 0.002 1.877 
Panel D: MRK Options 
All Data 13120 -0.997 0.129 0.369 -0.154 0.093 0.364 
R<-0.1 78 -0.117 0.551 0.695 -1.416 0.013 0.125 
R<-0.05 1095 -0.805 0.192 0.447 -1.218 0.099 0.778 
R>0.05 1510 -1.103 0.082 0.339 -1.145 0.093 0.283 
R>0.1 168 -1.521 0.042 0.185 -0.685 0.167 0.218 
Panel E: TXN Options 
All Data 63948 -1.277 0.058 0.372 -1.200 0.101 0.318 
R<-0.15 1743 -0.997 0.078 0.375 -1.361 0.052 0.483 
R<-0.1 859 -1.771 0.031 0.878 -1.787 0.041 4.389 
R<-0.05 7398 -1.310 0.067 0.304 -1.499 0.050 0.286 
R<0.05 42112 -1.231 0.058 0.371 -1.161 0.108 0.294 
R>0.05 9592 -1.404 0.048 0.440 -1.040 0.128 0.269 
















Table 1.2b:  Put-Call Parity And Stock Option Boundary Conditions Tests based 



















Panel A: GM Options 
All Data 53965 -0.418 0.129 0.083 -0.325 0.115 0.116 
R<-0.1 831 -0.371 0.114 0.162 -0.491 0.024 0.139 
R<-0.05 4761 -0.311 0.159 0.086 -0.359 0.071 0.102 
R>0.05 7575 -0.445 0.073 0.065 -0.236 0.188 0.137 
R>0.1 1460 -0.362 0.062 0.071 -0.234 0.217 0.126 
R>0.15 251 -0.350 0.040 0.073 -0.213 0.207 0.103 
Panel B: HWP Options 
All Data 23593 -0.193 0.198 0.123 -0.296 0.149 0.127 
R<-0.15 119 -0.171 0.244 0.086 -0.262 0.168 0.119 
R<-0.1 451 -0.202 0.226 0.105 -0.384 0.089 0.122 
R<-0.05 2571 -0.167 0.236 0.119 -0.373 0.094 0.129 
R>0.05 3308 -0.253 0.131 0.115 -0.215 0.226 0.145 
R>0.1 390 -0.237 0.115 0.214 -0.253 0.164 0.097 
R>0.15 355 -0.348 0.073 0.094 -0.239 0.200 0.153 
Panel C: IBM Options 
All Data 415361 -0.574 0.061 0.097 -0.449 0.143 0.081 
R<-0.15 2004 -0.315 0.083 0.076 -0.209 0.285 0.085 
R<-0.1 3382 -0.625 0.027 0.093 -0.385 0.279 0.111 
R<-0.05 27460 -0.605 0.063 0.090 -0.450 0.197 0.093 
R>0.05 32810 -0.493 0.083 0.082 -0.519 0.099 0.083 
R>0.1 1270 -0.525 0.036 0.043 -0.535 0.092 0.057 
Panel D: MRK Options 
All Data 39506 -0.360 0.160 0.115 -0.420 0.100 0.158 
R<-0.1 62 -1.006 0.000 0.153 -0.621 0.081 0.094 
R<-0.05 2999 -0.240 0.266 0.110 -0.466 0.067 0.131 
R>0.05 3973 -0.482 0.068 0.065 -0.435 0.118 0.166 
R>0.1 527 -0.545 0.030 0.153 -0.286 0.154 0.202 
Panel E: TXN Options 
All Data 13880 -0.215 0.245 0.186 -0.265 0.221 0.178 
R<-0.15 95 -0.266 0.232 0.189 -0.311 0.168 0.164 
R<-0.1 655 -0.070 0.398 0.230 -0.281 0.223 0.174 
R<-0.05 2160 -0.143 0.302 0.203 -0.294 0.188 0.181 
R<0.05 7724 -0.209 0.243 0.171 -0.259 0.218 0.175 
R>0.05 2360 -0.280 0.190 0.201 -0.243 0.268 0.183 














Figure 1-1 Relation between probability of B1 Boundary Condition  
Violations and Past 5-Day Stock Returns 
 
Panel A: GM Options 

























Panel B: HWP Options 


























Panel C: IBM Options 






































Panel D: MRK Options 



























Panel E: TXN Options 

















































Figure 1-2 Relation between Probability of B2 Boundary Condition  
Violations and Past 5-Day Stock Returns 
 
Panel A: GM Options 


























Panel B: HWP Options 

























Panel C: IBM Options 

































Panel D: MRK Options 





















Past 5-Day MRK Return  
 
Panel E: TXN Options 















































Table 1.3 First-Order Autocorrelation Coefficients For Five Selected Stocks  

















































































































































Table 1.4 Chi-Square Tests of the Relation between the Number of Option Pairs with 
Boudary Condition Violations and Past 5-Day Stock Returns 
 
 
Critical level of Chi-Square distribution with 1 degree of freedom: @1%=6.63. The results of 
Chi-Square tests of whether B2 is violated more often after positive returns (call is overpriced 
relative to put), and B1 is violated more often after negative returns (put is overpriced relative 
to call). B1 and B2 denote the following conditions: 
 
1 ( ) 0
2 ( ) 0
B C allprice P utprice Stockprice P V strikeprice
B P utprice C allprice Stockprice P V dividends Strikeprice
= − − + ≤
= − + − − ≤  
 
The top number in each box is the number of option pairs in which a violation of that 
boundary condition was observed as a function of R = Rt-60, t-1, the stock return from 
calendar day t-60 to t-1. The bottom number in each box in parenthesis is the expected 
number of option pairs with violations, under the null hypothesis of no relation between past 
returns and boundary condition violations.  
Panel A: GM Options 
 A. Unadjusted Prices B. Prices Net of Bid-Ask Spread 
 B1>0 B2>0 Total B1>0 B2>0 Total 
7877(5108) 7130(9899) 15007 3777(2497) 3298(4578) 7075 
4599(7368) 17047(14278) 21646 2802(4082) 8764(7484) 11566 




Chi-Square=3852.9  Chi-Square=1634.3  
1359(589) 1056(1826) 2415 736(340) 509(905) 1245 
1171(1941) 6786(6016) 7957 897(1293) 3836(3440) 4733 




Chi-Square=1734.9  Chi-Square=800.9  
122(23) 66(165) 188 124(27) 26(123) 150 
147(246) 1833(1734) 1980 120(217) 1109(1012) 1229 




Chi-Square=521.8  Chi-Square=487.9  
Panel B: HWP Options 
 A. Unadjusted Prices B. Prices Net of Bid-Ask Spread 
 B1>0 B2>0 Total B1>0 B2>0 Total 
5889(4840) 4837(5886) 10726 1836(1543) 1989(2282) 3825 
5071(6120) 8491(7442) 13562 1858(2151) 3474(3181) 5332 




Chi-Square=741.8  Chi-Square=160.1  
2100(1520) 1296(1876) 3396 593(466) 512(639) 1105 
1847(2427) 3577(2997) 5424 889(1016) 1521(1394) 2410 




Chi-Square=652.1  Chi-Square=87.4  
432(279) 128(281) 560 105(71) 41(75) 146 
391(544) 699(546) 1090 218(252) 301(267) 519 












Panel C: IBM Options 
 A. Unadjusted Prices B. Prices Net of Bid-Ask Spread 
 B1>0 B2>0 Total B1>0 B2>0 Total 
71234 24668 95902 27262 11911 39173 
39484 42986 82470 17151 22866 40017 




Chi-Square=13127.5  Chi-Square=5744.4  
11666 3163 14829 4390 1173 5563 
5369 8017 13386 2361 4178 6539 
R<-5% 
R>5% 
Total 17035 11180 28215 6751 5351 12102 
 Chi-Square=4372.8  Chi-Square=2233.1  
1520 356 1876 419 51 470 
124 207 331 51 32 83 




Chi-Square=280.9  Chi-Square=42.4  
Panel D: MRK Options 
 A. Unadjusted Prices B. Prices Net of Bid-Ask Spread 
 B1>0 B2>0 Total B1>0 B2>0 Total 
5593(4802) 2295(3086) 7888 1442(1339) 615(718) 2057 
2796(3545) 3097(2306) 5893 998(1101) 693(590) 1691 




Chi-Square=779.4  Chi-Square=50.2  
1187(937) 392(642) 1579 369(325) 103(148) 472 
436(686) 721(471) 1157 181(226) 147(103) 328 




Chi-Square=388.9  Chi-Square=47.6  
84(50) 32(66) 116 34(26) 10(18) 44 
23(57) 109(75) 132 10(18) 21(13) 31 




Chi-Square=76.1  Chi-Square=15.2  
Panel E: TXN Options 
 A. Unadjusted Prices B. Prices Net of Bid-Ask Spread 
 B1>0 B2>0 Total B1>0 B2>0 Total 
4151(3345) 3653(4459) 7804 954(788) 881(1047) 1835 
3149(3955) 6078(5272) 9227 908(1074) 1594(1428) 2502 




Chi-Square=627.3  Chi-Square=106.5  
1693(1290) 1124(1527) 2817 403(318) 252(337) 655 
1234(1637) 2343(1940) 3577 327(412) 523(438) 850 




Chi-Square=416.1  Chi-Square=78.7  
510(425) 329(414) 839 146(115) 57(88) 203 
298(383) 457(372) 755 68(99) 107(76) 175 

















Table 1.5 Implied Volatilities Separated by Call-Puts, Past 5-Day Returns, Maturity and 
Exercise Price 
 
Panel A: Call Implied Volatility when R > 0.05 
 
X* <.95 .95-.97 .97-.99 .99-1.01 1.01-1.03 1.01-1.03 >1.05 All 
Panel a: GM Options 
M=1 0.3711 0.3149 0.2686 0.2647 0.3523 0.3141 0.3342 0.3171
M=2 0.2832 0.2719 0.2584 0.2376 0.2295 0.2619 0.2936 0.2623
M=3 0.2517 0.2345 0.223 0.2266 0.2186 0.2531 0.251 0.2369
M=4 0.2501 0.2306 0.221 0.2095 0.207 0.2113 0.2207 0.2215
All 0.2890 0.2630 0.2428 0.2346 0.2519 0.2601 0.2749 0.2595
Panel b: HWP Options 
M=1 0.4016 0.37 0.3795 0.3717 0.3602 0.3897 0.4259 0.3855
M=2 0.3389 0.3458 0.3319 0.3252 0.3156 0.3288 0.3411 0.3325
M=3 0.3084 0.3232 0.3073 0.319 0.3168 0.3198 0.324 0.3169
M=4 0.2885 0.2858 0.2825 0.2935 0.2887 0.2883 0.299 0.2895
All 0.3344 0.3312 0.3253 0.3274 0.3203 0.3317 0.3475 0.3311
Panel c: IBM Options 
M=1 0.3778 0.3222 0.3056 0.2482 0.2613 0.2996 0.3499 0.3092
M=2 0.2918 0.2804 0.2441 0.2451 0.2333 0.2463 0.2952 0.2623
M=3 0.2559 0.231 0.2276 0.2223 0.2168 0.2197 0.2978 0.2387
M=4 0.2389 0.222 0.2245 0.2188 0.2116 0.2042 0.2382 0.2226
All 0.2911 0.2639 0.2505 0.2336 0.2308 0.2425 0.2953 0.2582
Panel d: MRK Options 
M=1 0.2491 0.2477 0.2525 0.2388 0.2469 0.2658 0.3069 0.2582
M=2 0.2741 0.2615 0.2689 0.2512 0.2567 0.2642 0.2505 0.2610
M=3 0.2843 0.2874 0.2871 0.2581 0.2591 0.2492 0.2965 0.2745
M=4 0.2648 0.2532 0.2552 0.2441 0.2562 0.2685 0.2465 0.2555
All 0.2681 0.2625 0.2659 0.2481 0.2547 0.2619 0.2751 0.2623
Panel e: TXN Options 
M=1 0.4353 0.3893 0.3858 0.3660 0.3791 0.4057 0.4502 0.4016
M=2 0.3710 0.3420 0.3415 0.3458 0.3406 0.3490 0.3742 0.3520
M=3 0.2994 0.2822 0.3113 0.2945 0.2829 0.3091 0.3263 0.3008
M=4 0.3078 0.2845 0.2859 0.2949 0.2776 0.2783 0.3115 0.2915



















Panel B: Call-Implied Volatility when R < -0.05 
X* <.95 .95-.97 .97-.99 .99-1.01 1.01-1.03 1.01-1.03 >1.05 All 
Panel a: GM Options 
M=1 0.3664 0.3361 0.3055 0.2984 0.3575 0.3308 0.3895 0.3406
M=2 0.2996 0.2979 0.292 0.2858 0.2678 0.2816 0.3579 0.2975
M=3 0.2711 0.257 0.2548 0.2516 0.2453 0.2519 0.2767 0.2583
M=4 0.2752 0.2584 0.2769 0.2628 0.2521 0.2443 0.2571 0.2610
All 0.3031 0.2874 0.2823 0.2747 0.2807 0.2772 0.3203 0.2894
Panel b: HWP Options 
M=1 0.4259 0.4024 0.382 0.3675 0.3751 0.3708 0.4131 0.3910
M=2 0.3582 0.3668 0.3513 0.3612 0.3577 0.3578 0.3839 0.3624
M=3 0.3213 0.3436 0.3276 0.3235 0.3241 0.3288 0.3344 0.3290
M=4 0.3076 0.3281 0.3104 0.3149 0.3184 0.3065 0.3239 0.3157
All 0.3533 0.3602 0.3428 0.3418 0.3438 0.3410 0.3638 0.3495
Panel c: IBM Options 
M=1 0.3936 0.3617 0.3353 0.3246 0.2986 0.3336 0.3926 0.3486
M=2 0.3253 0.2929 0.2831 0.2692 0.2494 0.2811 0.3531 0.2934
M=3 0.3213 0.3159 0.2809 0.3209 0.2352 0.284 0.4051 0.3090
M=4 0.2774 0.2761 0.2546 0.2284 0.2167 0.2253 0.2517 0.2472
All 0.3294 0.3117 0.2885 0.2858 0.2500 0.2810 0.3506 0.2996
Panel d: MRK Options 
M=1 0.3104 0.3148 0.3212 0.3014 0.3035 0.293 0.3133 0.3082
M=2 0.2549 0.261 0.2691 0.274 0.2818 0.2972 0.3183 0.2795
M=3 0.2838 0.2856 0.271 0.2446 0.2589 0.257 0.3004 0.2716
M=4 0.3104 0.2813 0.2955 0.2938 0.2808 0.2998 0.2849 0.2924
All 0.2899 0.2857 0.2892 0.2785 0.2813 0.2868 0.3042 0.2879
Panel e: TXN Options 
M=1 0.4886 0.496 0.4594 0.4057 0.4505 0.4609 0.4895 0.4644
M=2 0.3981 0.4238 0.3972 0.3754 0.3916 0.4034 0.4238 0.4019
M=3 0.3991 0.3292 0.3537 0.3588 0.3666 0.3502 0.4073 0.3664
M=4 0.3432 0.3376 0.3366 0.3207 0.3226 0.3228 0.3373 0.3315

























Panel C: Put-Implied Volatility when R> 0.05 
X* <.95 .95-.97 .97-.99 .99-1.01 1.01-1.03 1.01-1.03 >1.05 All 
Panel a: GM Options 
M=1 0.432 0.3678 0.3399 0.3261 0.36 0.4248 0.4269 0.3825
M=2 0.3589 0.3297 0.3228 0.3316 0.3372 0.3547 0.4084 0.3490
M=3 0.3669 0.3373 0.3575 0.3368 0.3308 0.3459 0.3927 0.3526
M=4 0.3553 0.3312 0.3276 0.3361 0.3585 0.3425 0.3587 0.3443
All 0.3783 0.3415 0.3370 0.3327 0.3466 0.3670 0.3967 0.3571
Panel b: HWP Options 
M=1 0.4616 0.4171 0.4029 0.4117 0.4107 0.4521 0.4807 0.4338
M=2 0.4141 0.3999 0.3805 0.3713 0.3676 0.3786 0.4053 0.3882
M=3 0.4103 0.3796 0.3775 0.3843 0.3922 0.3913 0.3926 0.3897
M=4 0.3834 0.3694 0.3705 0.3681 0.3778 0.3761 0.376 0.3745
All 0.4174 0.3915 0.3829 0.3839 0.3871 0.3995 0.4137 0.3965
Panel c: IBM Options 
M=1 0.3476 0.318 0.2899 0.2904 0.3022 0.3401 0.4545 0.3347
M=2 0.309 0.2951 0.2631 0.282 0.2826 0.2826 0.3305 0.2921
M=3 0.2857 0.2778 0.2544 0.2747 0.2733 0.28 0.3392 0.2836
M=4 0.2894 0.2755 0.275 0.2708 0.2854 0.2869 0.2997 0.2832
All 0.3079 0.2916 0.2706 0.2795 0.2859 0.2974 0.3560 0.2984
Panel e: MRK Options 
M=1 0.3832 0.3156 0.3008 0.3056 0.2969 0.3691 0.4454 0.3452
M=2 0.3285 0.2966 0.2914 0.2888 0.2865 0.3078 0.3484 0.3069
M=3 0.3309 0.2854 0.291 0.3059 0.2817 0.3046 0.3741 0.3105
M=4 0.2822 0.276 0.2706 0.2745 0.2582 0.2743 0.2916 0.2753
All 0.3312 0.2934 0.2885 0.2937 0.2808 0.3140 0.3649 0.3095
Panel e: TXN Options 
M=1 0.48 0.4331 0.4118 0.4008 0.4104 0.4519 0.4796 0.4382
M=2 0.4397 0.4023 0.394 0.3962 0.3908 0.4011 0.4369 0.4087
M=3 0.4155 0.3664 0.4097 0.3745 0.3531 0.3746 0.3998 0.3848
M=4 0.4058 0.3856 0.3778 0.3903 0.38 0.3819 0.3911 0.3875

























Panel D: Put-Implied Volatility when R< -0.05 
X* <.95 .95-.97 .97-.99 .99-1.01 1.01-1.03 1.01-1.03 >1.05 All 
Panel a: GM Options 
M=1 0.4705 0.3737 0.3706 0.3475 0.3447 0.3888 0.4936 0.3985
M=2 0.4384 0.381 0.3874 0.382 0.3643 0.38 0.4864 0.4028
M=3 0.3528 0.3494 0.3282 0.3246 0.3641 0.3609 0.4148 0.3564
M=4 0.3446 0.3571 0.3482 0.3421 0.3472 0.3306 0.357 0.3467
All 0.4016 0.3653 0.3586 0.3491 0.3551 0.3651 0.4380 0.3761
Panel b: HWP Options 
M=1 0.47 0.4484 0.4044 0.386 0.425 0.4385 0.4749 0.4353
M=2 0.4105 0.4028 0.3819 0.3925 0.3862 0.3839 0.4419 0.4000
M=3 0.4068 0.3835 0.3809 0.3682 0.3686 0.3708 0.399 0.3825
M=4 0.3789 0.3842 0.3798 0.3706 0.3702 0.3664 0.3852 0.3765
All 0.4166 0.4047 0.3868 0.3793 0.3875 0.3899 0.4253 0.3986
Panel c: IBM Options 
M=1 0.4443 0.3669 0.3382 0.3368 0.3262 0.3641 0.4477 0.3749
M=2 0.3884 0.3247 0.3111 0.2947 0.3138 0.306 0.3813 0.3314
M=3 0.3628 0.3072 0.2773 0.3049 0.3124 0.2972 0.5025 0.3378
M=4 0.3214 0.3035 0.2848 0.2743 0.272 0.2844 0.3088 0.2927
All 0.3792 0.3256 0.3029 0.3027 0.3061 0.3129 0.4101 0.3342
Panel d: MRK Options 
M=1 0.395 0.399 0.3923 0.3523 0.3449 0.4118 0.4769 0.3960
M=2 0.3699 0.3249 0.3276 0.326 0.302 0.3153 0.3858 0.3359
M=3 0.3895 0.385 0.3768 0.3665 0.3641 0.3934 0.5963 0.4102
M=4 0.3037 0.2953 0.3044 0.2996 0.2901 0.2889 0.3331 0.3022
All 0.3645 0.3511 0.3503 0.3361 0.3253 0.3524 0.4480 0.3611
Panel e: TXN Options 
M=1 0.538 0.492 0.4617 0.4356 0.4467 0.4725 0.4859 0.4761
M=2 0.4703 0.4411 0.4101 0.4083 0.4101 0.429 0.4544 0.4319
M=3 0.418 0.4003 0.4109 0.4065 0.4063 0.3942 0.4256 0.4088
M=4 0.4167 0.4019 0.3832 0.3705 0.3874 0.3938 0.3993 0.3933
























Table 1.6 Sample Characteristics of Volatility Spread for Five Selected Stocks 
 
 Mean Std. dev. max 90% 
Medi-
an 10% min 1ρ  2ρ  3ρ  No. 
Panel A: GM Options 
ATM Options Only -0.054 0.088 0.543 0.038 -0.050 -0.158 -0.365 0.586 0.235 0.120 3391 
Equal-Weighted -0.079 0.056 0.091 -0.017 -0.071 -0.156 -0.352 0.835 0.313 0.151 3995 
Elasticity-Wtd -0.073 0.056 0.110 -0.011 -0.064 -0.150 -0.347 0.817 0.293 0.152 3995 
Vega-Weighted -0.087 0.055 0.081 -0.025 -0.080 -0.162 -0.360 0.899 0.308 0.136 3995 
Panel B: HWP Options 
ATM Options Only -0.036 0.065 1.247 0.024 -0.032 -0.110 -0.342 0.491 0.265 0.184 3606 
Equal-Weighted -0.049 0.044 0.959 -0.011 -0.043 -0.099 -0.274 0.591 0.293 0.219 3832 
Elasticity-Wtd -0.050 0.045 0.961 -0.010 -0.044 -0.102 -0.301 0.575 0.272 0.210 3832 
Vega-Weighted -0.050 0.037 0.553 -0.016 -0.042 -0.095 -0.267 0.730 0.338 0.227 3832 
Panel C: IBM Options 
ATM Options Only -0.001 0.090 1.951 0.060 -0.006 -0.069 -0.284 0.388 0.183 0.152 3204 
Equal-Weighted -0.029 0.090 2.397 0.008 -0.029 -0.091 -0.253 0.379 0.175 0.176 3746 
Elasticity-Wtd -0.028 0.084 2.396 0.009 -0.026 -0.087 -0.270 0.347 0.116 0.139 3746 
Vega-Weighted -0.038 0.099 2.399 -0.008 -0.040 -0.099 -0.249 0.380 0.134 0.159 3746 
Panel D: MRK Options 
ATM Options Only -0.037 0.071 0.377 0.041 -0.039 -0.118 -0.353 0.682 0.336 0.200 3216 
Equal-Weighted -0.041 0.065 0.368 0.034 -0.046 -0.110 -0.355 0.797 0.362 0.170 3548 
Elasticity-Wtd -0.041 0.073 0.398 0.042 -0.047 -0.117 -0.328 0.674 0.361 0.171 3548 
Vega-Weighted -0.047 0.060 0.366 0.022 -0.051 -0.111 -0.307 0.889 0.339 0.170 3548 
Panel E: TXN Options 
ATM Options Only -0.047 0.064 0.576 0.024 -0.046 -0.120 -0.596 0.422 0.247 0.185 3418 
Equal-Weighted -0.054 0.041 0.236 -0.008 -0.049 -0.108 -0.385 0.643 0.233 0.180 3757 
Elasticity-Wtd -0.050 0.045 0.220 0.000 -0.048 -0.109 -0.388 0.591 0.250 0.124 3757 

















Table 1.7 Cross-Correlation’s of Volatility Spread for Five Selected Stocks  
Options by Weighting Type 
 
Panel A: GM Options 
 Elasticity-weighted equal-weighted vega-weighted 
At-the-money only .438 .484 .528 
Elasticity weighted ____ .910 .971 
Equal weighted ____ ____ .954 
Panel B: HWP Options 
 Elasticity-weighted equal-weighted vega-weighted 
At-the-money only .658 .765 .674 
Elasticity weighted ____ .965 .882 
Equal weighted ____ ____ .933 
Panel C: IBM Options 
 Elasticity-weighted equal-weighted vega-weighted 
At-the-money only .624 .729 .646 
Elasticity weighted ____ .931 .787 
Equal weighted ____ ____ .924 
Panel D: MRK Options 
 Elasticity-weighted equal-weighted vega-weighted 
At-the-money only .829 .900 .845 
Elasticity weighted ____ .935 .831 
Equal weighted ____ ____ .933 
Panel E: TXN Options 
 Elasticity-weighted equal-weighted vega-weighted 
At-the-money only .510 .657 .603 
Elasticity weighted ____ .947 .840 


























0 1 , 1 ( ) ;t t k t tVolatilitySpread R A Lα α ε− −= + +  
This table reports the results of time-series regressions of equally-weighted volatility spread (call-
implied volatility – put-implied volatility) versus past 2-week (k=10) to 20-week (k=100) stock 
returns. An AR(5) model is fitted to eliminate the effect of autocorrelation in the residuals. The p-
values are reported in parentheses. N is the number of observations. Rt-k, t-1 is the stock return from 
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N 3757                     1689                          2005 
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Table 1.9 Regression of Volatility Spread on Past Stock Returns, Historical Volatility, 




0 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 1
0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 2
0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 3
( ) ( ) ( )k k k k t
k k k k k k t
k k k k k k t
VolSpread R E E Skewness E Kurtosis
b b b b b b
Skewness c c Skewness c Skewness c Skewness c Skewness c Skewness
Kurto
α α α σ α α ε
σ σ σ σ σ σ ε
ε
+ + +
− − − − −
− − − − −
= + + + + +
= + + + + + +
= + + + + + +
0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 4k k k k k k tsis d d Kurtosis d Kurtosis d Kurtosis d Kurtosis d Kurtosis ε− − − − −= + + + + + +
 
 
Estimates are from GMM. The p-values for the estimated coefficients are in parentheses, 
while the Wald statistics tests the hypothesis that all estimated coefficients are equal to zero. 
Volatility spread is computed from elasticity-weighted options for each day. Rk is the stock 
return from date t-k to t-1. kσ is the estimated historical volatility of the stock returns from 
day t-k to t-1. Skewnessk is the estimated skewness coefficient of the stock returns from day 
t-k to t-1, and Kurtosisk is the estimated kurtosis coefficient of the stock returns from day t-k 
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One fundamental question in market microstructure is how private information about 
underlying assets gets incorporated into asset prices through the trading process. It is 
now generally accepted that such private information is usually revealed through 
trades by informed traders and learning from these trades by other market participants 
such as market makers and uninformed traders. In this sense, studies on the 
interaction between informed traders and uninformed traders (a.k.a liquidity traders) 
are especially important for a better understanding of the private information 
incorporation process. Using corporate insiders as proxies for informed traders15, this 
paper studies insider trades around two distinct settings, i.e., scheduled versus 
unscheduled corporate announcements to investigate how insiders trade differentially 
based on their private information when there is a dispersion in the amount of 
liquidity trading around such announcements. 
 
Scheduled and unscheduled announcement events are defined by whether the timing 
information as to when an announcement will be issued is publicly available or not. 
Scheduled announcements are those where such information is publicly available 
whereas unscheduled announcements refer to cases where such information is not 
publicly available. Classification of major corporate events into scheduled and 
                                                        
15Corporate insiders are quite natural proxies for informed traders. The fact that there are plenty of 
corporate information events makes this proxy even more appealing when we examine insider trades 








unscheduled announcements has one important advantage for our purposes: it 
provides us with a unique setting of timing-varying liquidity trading where we can 
examine how insiders respond to time-variation in liquidity trading. More specifically, 
when timing information is available, discretionary liquidity traders in the sense of 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) know that a large flow of information will be released 
on a specific date. Since they do not know what the information is, they can respond 
by changing the timing of their trades. For example, they might postpone their trading 
if they anticipate adverse price movements associated with the information release. In 
contrast, when timing information is not available, liquidity traders might not change 
the timing of their trades and trade just as usual. We believe this differential trading 
pattern has important implications for insider trading. As predicted by the strategic 
trading literature, informed traders will try to hide themselves among liquidity trading 
to prevent their private information being revealed fully and too quickly16. To the 
extent that the amount of liquidity trading is time-varying around scheduled versus 
unscheduled announcements, they provide different covers for informed trading. Our 
empirical results provide direct evidence that such informed trading actually manifests 
itself in the trading volume and profitability of insider trades around such 
announcement events. 
 
Following Chae (2005), we use earnings announcements as scheduled announcements 
and M&A announcements as unscheduled announcements. Quarterly earnings 
announcements are usually routinely made by listed companies and involve a release 
of information in which the timing is publicly known17. In comparison, neither the 
timing nor the magnitude and direction of the merger announcements is public 
                                                        
16See Kyle (1985, 1989), Adamati and Pleiderer (1988), Holden and Subramanyam (1992), Foster and 
Viswanathan (1994, 1996), Huddart, Hughes and Levine (2001) for an incomplete list of strategic 
trading literature. 
17The evidence in Bagnoli, Kross and Watts (2002) is that, by and large, firms do announce earnings on 
the planned-and-disclosed date, which suggests that earnings announcement dates are known in 
advance and sticky. Chordia, Roll and Subramanyam (2001) also mention that earnings announcements 









information. As noted by Chae (2005), these two types of announcements are chosen 
because they represent major corporate events that have substantial impacts on stock 
prices18. 
 
Our paper fits into the insider trading literature. Existing insider trading literature has 
separately investigated insider trading around earnings announcements and M&A 
announcements19. While these studies provide lots of insights into the informational 
content of insider trades around such announcement events, none of them exploit the 
unique feature of time-varying liquidity trading to investigate insider trading around 
these two types of announcements simultaneously. Availing ourselves of the striking 
difference in the degree of information asymmetry that results from time-varying 
liquidity trading around such announcement events, our paper is the first one to 
examine insider trading patterns under such asymmetric information settings. In a 
paper closely related to our study, Aboody and Lev (2000) hypothesize that research 
and development (R&D) activities increase the information asymmetry between 
insiders and investors, thereby allowing insiders at firms with high R&D spending to 
reap higher profits from their trading than insiders at other firms. Consistent with their 
hypothesis, they report greater excess stock returns between the transaction date and 
the reporting date for insider trades at firms with high R&D spending compared with 
other firms. Our paper differs from theirs in that we do not reply on R&D spending as 
a proxy for information asymmetry. Instead, we focus directly on the nature of two 
distinct types of corporate announcements that are uniquely characterized by different 
degrees of information asymmetry. Roulstone (2006) also studies the relationship 
between insider trading and the informational content of earnings announcement. But 
                                                        
18See Ball and Brown (1968), Jensen and Ruback (1983), Foster et. al. (1984), Dennis (1986), Bamber 
(1987), Bernard and Thomas (1989), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Ball and Kothari (1991), Hand et. al. 
(1992), Keown and Bolster (1992), Mitchell and Stafford (2004), Clara (2006) and others for studies on 
stock prices around such events. 
19 See Sivakumar and Waymire (1994), Ke, Huddart and Petroni (2003), Huddart et. al. (2006), 
Roulstone (2006) and others for insider trading around earnings announcements; See Keown (1981), 
Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Melbroek (1992), Cornell and Sirri (1992), Arshadi and Eyssell (1993) and 








his focus is on whether the net effect of insider trading promotes more accurate stock 
pricing by conveying insiders' private information to market participants. While in 
this paper, we are more focused on how corporate insiders trade differentially based 
on time-varying liquidity trading and the dispersion of information asymmetry. 
Huddart et. al. (2007) also examines a variety of information asymmetry measures to 
investigate the relationship of such measures to aspects of insiders' trades. Unlike our 
present paper, they focus exclusively on earnings announcements. 
 
Our paper is also related to other strands of literature. Firstly, the strategic trading 
literature. To the extent that informed traders trade strategically by either spreading 
their trades over time or trading when liquidity trading is most intensive, our paper 
provides direct evidence that insiders trade more heavily and profitably when liquidity 
trading provides better camouflages for their trades. Secondly, the empirical literature 
about PIN measure and its application in corporate finance context; Given the 
increasing prevalence of applying PIN measure in corporate finance studies, it is 
interesting to ask whether PIN measure captures the information structure associated 
with these two distinct types of corporate events. Our findings suggest that PIN 
measure performs quite well in this case. Thirdly, our paper is also closely related to 
the trading volume literature around major corporate information events. George et. al. 
(1994) propose that high trading volume immediately after corporate announcements 
is a result of increased liquidity trading. Kim and Verrecchia (1991) and Atiase and 
Bamber (1994) offer another explanation of increasing trading volume on/after 
corporate announcements. Our paper differs from their work in that we focus on 
insider trading volume both before and after announcement events. To the extent that 
liquidity trading volume increases after corporate announcement events, we need to 
control for this increase when we examine insider trading volume. 
 
Perhaps our paper is most closely related to Chae (2005), which investigates trading 
volume before scheduled and unscheduled corporate announcements to explore how 








decreases prior to scheduled announcements. In contrast, trading volume before 
unscheduled announcements increases dramatically. And the opposite relation holds 
for volume after the announcements. Our analysis differs from his in that we examine 
insider trading volume instead of total trading volume. To the extent that total trading 
volume increases (decreases) before unscheduled (scheduled) announcements, his 
paper provides a basis for our analysis. As shown by Jeng et. al. (2003), insider 
trading volume only accounts for a very limited portion of total trading volume. Given 
this fact, we argue that the increase (decrease) in total trading volume before 
unscheduled (scheduled) announcements can reliably translate to increase (decrease) 
in the amount of liquidity trading. In this sense, we believe Chae (2005) provides a 
first-pass test for our main hypotheses. Given that discretionary liquidity traders do 
change their trading behavior depending on the availability of timing information 
around scheduled versus unscheduled announcements, it is meaningful to ask whether 
insiders respond to and internalize such trading behavior. 
 
Our main contributions are mainly two-fold: first, by resorting to the argument of 
time-varying liquidity trading, we are able to show that the degree of information 
asymmetry differs across scheduled versus unscheduled announcements. We further 
test directly whether the recently emerged PIN measure (probability of information-
based trading) (Easley et. al. (1996, 2002)) captures information asymmetry around 
such announcement events. Since the widely-used market microstructure PIN measure 
is derived from an well-specified structured model, it is not surprising that the 
majority of the asset pricing literature presumes that PIN captures information 
asymmetry and provides direct evidence that PIN is actually priced in asset returns 
(Easley, Hvidkjaer and O'Hara (2002, 2004)). However, little is yet known as to how 
PIN fares when it is used to capture information asymmetry around material corporate 
events. Clara (2006) is among the few studies that examine the performance of PIN in 
corporate finance context. Using earnings announcement as the main information 
events, she finds that stocks with higher PIN values have smaller post-earnings-








announcement prices. In this paper we investigate whether PIN measures 
characterizes informed trading as a response to time-varying liquidity trading around 
major announcement events. We find that PIN is much higher before unscheduled 
announcements than before scheduled announcements20. We interpret this evidence as 
consistent with the notion of strategic trading by corporate insiders. 
 
Second, given that liquidity trading is time varying and information asymmetry is 
much higher before unscheduled announcements than before scheduled 
announcements as suggested by PIN, it is quite natural to ask whether corporate 
insiders make use of this differential information structure and trade accordingly. The 
comprehensive insider trading dataset we use in this paper, combined with the rich 
sets of corporate announcements, provides an ideal setting for such studies. We 
investigate whether there are differential patterns in insider trading volume and 
profitability. More specifically, we examine whether insiders trade more intensively 
before unscheduled announcements than before scheduled announcements and 
whether insider trades before unscheduled announcements are more profitable. For 
both of these two conjectures, we find supportive evidence. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 formally develops the main 
hypotheses; In Section 3 we describe the data and methodology that are used to test 
the main hypotheses. Section 4 contains the main empirical results for insider trading 
volume and insider trading profitability. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
 
 Many event studies about corporate announcements, such as earnings and takeovers, 
                                                        
20What surprises us is the finding that PIN is much higher after target(acquiror) announcements than 
before target(acquiror)announcements. While this finding itself is puzzling, it is consistent with Aktas 
et. al. (2006). They also find similar patterns in PIN around M&A announcements. Several possible 








indicate that a considerable amount of information is released around these 
announcements. These releases of information often generate large price changes. For 
example, the absolute daily price change on earnings announcements, acquisition 
announcements, target announcements is about 56%, 45%, 287% higher than the 
average absolute price changer on other days in the same month respectively. 
Therefore, it seems quite plausible that there exists severe information asymmetry 
between informed and uninformed investors immediately before such announcements. 
Moreover, we argue that the degree of information asymmetry differs substantially 
around scheduled versus unscheduled announcements. This is due to the direct effect 
of the different nature of these announcements on the amount of liquidity trading. As 
we argue in the introduction, quarterly earnings announcements are often routinely 
scheduled. As shown in Bagnoli et. al. (2002), lots of firms announce earnings on 
planned-and-disclosed date, which suggests that earnings announcement dates are 
usually known in advance 21 . In contrast, merger announcements are usually 
unscheduled and abrupt. Uninformed investors can not predict when such 
announcement will be made until it becomes public information. 
 
As a consequence, the amount of liquidity trading varies around these two types of 
announcements. Consider scheduled announcements first. Knowing that there is a 
high possibility of trading with informed traders, uninformed traders will participate 
less in the market, or in an extreme case, exit the stock market before such 
announcements is made 22 . Consequently, the amount of liquidity trading might 
decrease. A necessary condition for this to happen is that uninformed investors 
perceive a high level of information asymmetry and rationally expects that they might 
be ripped off by informed traders. This is more so for scheduled announcements than 
for unscheduled announcements, since uninformed traders knowingly expect lots of 
                                                        
21They also show that any delay in scheduled earnings announcements leads to significantly negative 
stock price reactions and economic losses for such firms. 









information will be released prior to scheduled announcements whereas he has no 
such expectation out of unscheduled announcements. In other words, before 
scheduled announcements, uninformed traders acknowledges the possibility that 
trading demand from informed traders and the adverse selection of trading might be 
high and hence, avoid unnecessary trading. In contrast, since uninformed traders can 
not predict when unscheduled announcements will take place, they will trade just as 
usual. An outcome of this scenario is that liquidity trading is much higher before 
unscheduled announcements than before scheduled announcements. Consistent with 
this argument, Chae (2005) finds a more than 15% decrease in cumulative trading 
volume before scheduled announcements and a steady increase before unscheduled 
announcements23. 
 
Now consider what happens to informed traders. Strategic trading models predict that 
insiders always want to hide their private-information trading among liquidity trading. 
Now that there will be thinner liquidity trading to sustain insider trading before 
scheduled announcements, insiders are less able to hide their trading before scheduled 
announcements than before unscheduled announcements. All else equal, they will 
choose to trade more heavily before unscheduled announcements for information 
reasons24. In contrast, if insiders trade solely for liquidity reasons, they will not need 
to hide themselves in the first place. Our hypothesis 1 formalizes this intuition. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Insider trading before scheduled announcements is more likely to be 
liquidity-motivated rather than information-motivated than insider trading before 
unscheduled announcements, and hence, less profitable. 
 
                                                        
23As further corroborative evidence, Chae (2005) also shows that over a cross section of stocks, 
decreases in trading volume before scheduled announcements are correlated with the extent of 
information asymmetry. In contrast, no such relation holds before unscheduled announcements. 
24 Other factors may also play a role when examining insider trading volume before these 
announcements. For example, litigation concern is one such factor. Huddart et. al. (2006) provides 








Our second hypothesis is a direct corollary of Hypothesis 1. Now that more private 
information-based trading is expected before unscheduled announcements as 
compared to scheduled announcements, we would expect any measure that captures 
information asymmetry should be higher before unscheduled announcements. 
Relating this argument to the PIN as an information asymmetry measure in the sense 
of Easley et. al. (1996, 2002), our Hypothesis 2 is stated as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 2: If PIN captures information asymmetry, PIN measure should be much 
higher before unscheduled announcements than before scheduled announcements25. 
 
Our third hypothesis examines insider trading volume. Note first that even if insider 
trades are more profitable before unscheduled announcements, insider trading volume 
may or may not be different across these two types of announcements. This is because 
many other factors can also affect insider trading volume around such events, among 
which litigation concerns resulting from federal regulation and corporate restrictions 
arguably have the most important effect. As shown by Bettis et. al. (2000), it is not 
uncommon that many companies have initiated and implemented restrictions that 
discourage or prohibit insiders from trading around major corporate events. Huddart 
et. al. (2006) also provides compelling evidence that insiders condition their trades on 
foreknowledge of price-relevant public disclosures and avoid profitable trades when 
jeopardy due to trade is high. In other words, insiders may avoid profitable trades 
before announcement events if the offsetting effect from litigation concerns is high 
enough. Taking this into account, we leave it an empirical question to determine 
whether there is difference in insider trading volume before schedule versus 
unscheduled announcements. 
 
                                                        
25We want to emphasize that Hypothesis 2 is, in essence, a joint hypothesis of PIN measure as an 
information asymmetry measure and informed trading before announcement events. The rejection of 
Hypothesis 2 can mean: either PIN does not capture information asymmetry in this case; or informed 








Hypothesis 3: Insider trading volume before scheduled announcements is not different 
from that before unscheduled announcements. 
 
Our last hypothesis pertains to insider trading volume and profitability after 
scheduled/unscheduled announcements. Again we start by considering liquidity 
trading after such events. To the extent that discretionary liquidity traders' liquidity 
demands are exogenous and have to be satisfied eventually, the amount of liquidity 
trading should be much higher after scheduled announcements than after unscheduled 
announcements. This is because liquidity traders refrain from trading before 
scheduled announcements whereas they do not do so before unscheduled 
announcements. This could mean that better camouflages are available after scheduled 
announcements. On the other hand, information asymmetry associated with these 
announcements is largely resolved once these announcements are made public. Taking 
this into account, we may presume that much higher liquidity trading after scheduled 
announcements does not translate directly to higher profitability for insider trades 
after scheduled announcements. Similarly, insider trading volume may not differ 
across these two types of announcement events. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Insider trading volume and profitability after scheduled announcements 
is not different from those after unscheduled announcements. 
 
2.3 Data and Methodology 
  
2.3.1 CRSP,I/B/E/S and SDC Data 
 The data used in this study come from five sources. From the Center for Research in 
Securities Prices (CRSP) we obtain the daily returns, daily trading volume and other 
supportive variables for both the announcement events and insider trades. I/B/E/S data 
from 1993-2005 are used for the earnings announcement dates. Reporting dates for 








matching with other databases through CUSIP numbers, we are left with a total 
number of 289,099 earnings announcements dates for about 15,000 firms during this 
period. Acquisition and target announcements for NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ 
stocks are collected from SDC plantium complied by Thomson Financial Securities 
Data. SDC's merger and acquisition database provides us with an initial number of 
24,650 target announcements and 59,121 acquiror announcements from 1993-200526. 
Since we need to estimate PIN around these announcement events, we further require 
that any two successive announcements events be at least 3 months apart. We are left 
with a total of 179,311 announcement events for 17,224 firms after imposing this 
restriction. 
2.3.2 Insider Trading Data 
 Insider trading data are obtained from First Call/Thomson Financial Insider Research 
Services Historical Files. The insider trading records are the transactions of persons 
subject to the disclosure requirements of Section 16(a) of the Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934 reported on Form 4 and 527. Among the information required on Form 4 
are: name and address of reporting address, issuer name and ticker or trading symbol, 
relationship of reporting person to the issuer (officers, directors or other positions held 
by the reporting persons in issuers), whether it is a purchase or sale, the transaction 
date, price, trade size. Since it has been documented that this database contains a 
number of data errors28, we impose a number of filters to purge this database and 
obtain a clean version of insider trades. First, we require that trading records have a 
matching CUSIP with data available from CRSP. Second, we only focus on open 
market transactions in equity securities. Third, we require that any reported trades 
                                                        
26In comparison, Chae (2005) obtain a total of 25,087 and 12,485 announcements for acquiror and 
target announcements respectively between 1986 and 2000. 
27According the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, the term "corporate insiders" refers to corporate 
officers, directors and large shareholders who own more than ten percent of the firms' stock. If insiders 
buy or sell their firms' stock, they are mandated to file with the Securities and Exchanges Commission 
(SEC) within the first 10 days of the next month after their transactions. Starting from August 29, 2002, 
insiders are required to report their trades within two business days. 








have a transaction price that is within daily price range as recorded in CRSP for the 
corresponding trading day. We also delete any trading records with transaction price 
less than 1 dollar and shares traded less than 100 shares. As suggested by Jeng et. al., 
we also purge duplicate transactions (i.e., those with identical entries in all categories). 
Finally, we only examine trades by top executives and officers and directors. Insider 
trades by large shareholders are excluded from our analysis29. 
2.3.3 PIN estimation 
 To estimate PIN measure, we make use of TAQ database available from NYSE. Each 
trade record in TAQ contains information on ticker symbol of the traded stocks, 
transaction price, trade size, trade time and the exchange on which the trade occurred. 
Each quote record in TAQ contains information on ticker symbol of the quoted stocks, 
bid/ask price, bid/ask depth, quote time and the exchange on which the quote occurred. 
The estimation of PIN measure requires each trade be signed as either buy-initiated or 
seller-initiated trades. We use Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to achieve this 
purpose30. We require that all trades and quotes must take place between 9:30 AM and 
4:00 PM. We also focus on trades and quotes that come from the exchange on which 
the stock is listed. 
 
The PIN measure is a private information measure because it is a function of 
abnormal order flow. The underlying assumption is that public information is directly 
incorporated into prices without going through the trading process, whereas private 
information presumably should be reflected in excess buying or excess selling 
pressure (abnormal order flow). Not surprisingly, estimation of PIN measure requires 
detailed information on the structure of order flow. What follows is a brief summary 
                                                        
29Since our intent is to use corporate insiders as proxies for informed traders to analyze the trades 
motivated by private information, it is appropriate to exclude trades by entities that statue defines as 
insiders for the sole reason that the entity owns a block of ten percent or more of the corporation's stock. 
Aboody and Lev (2000), among others, also exclude those trades. 









of the model. Please refer to Easley and O'Hara (1992) for an extensive discussion of 
the structure of the model. 
 
The model consists of three types of players: liquidity traders, informed traders and a 
market maker. The main assumptions are: all players are risk neutral; there are no 
transaction costs and there is no discounting by traders. Liquidity traders buy or sell 
shares for reasons that are exogeneous to the model. Suppose the daily arrival rates of 
noise traders that submit buy and sell orders are bε  and sε  respectively. The 
probability that an information event occurs is α , in which case the probability of bad 
news is δ  and the probability of good news is 1-δ . If an information event occurs, 
the arrival rate of informed traders is μ . Informed traders submit a sell order if they 
get bad news and a buy order if they get good news. Thus, on a day with no 
information event with probability 1-α , the arrival rate of buy order will be bε  and 
the arrival rate of sell order will be sε . On a day with a bad information event with 
probability α δ , the arrival rate of a buy order will be bε , and the arrival rate of sell 
order will be sε +μ . On a day with a good information event with probability α (1-
δ ), the arrival rate of a buy order will be bε μ+  and the arrival rate of a sell order 
will be sε . Let θ  = { sε , bε , α , δ }. The likelihood function for a single trading day 
is given by:  
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 Here, B  is the number of buy orders and S  is the number of sell orders in a single 
trading day. Using trading information over J  days and assuming cross-trading-day 








maximizing the following likelihood function:  
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Then, the probability of informed trading in a given stock for a given period, which 
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Intuitively, PIN is low for stocks with less fluctuations of daily buy and sell orders. If 
a stock receives roughly balanced buy and sell orders from day to day, these orders 
are more likely to originate from investor's independent liquidity needs or liquidity 
trading. The law of large numbers will smooth out these orders and consequently the 
probability of information events is small. In comparison, for stocks that exhibit 
frequent large deviations from their normal order flows, PIN measure will be much 
higher. Also notice that in the above equation, PIN increases monotonically in α  (the 
probability of an information event) and μ  (the arrival rate of informed traders). We 
will discuss more about this in our empirical tests. 
 
Since our research question aims at investigating information asymmetry around 
scheduled and unscheduled announcement events, we require that a minimum number 
of 20 trading days for PIN estimation. Also, 30 trading days centered around the 
announcement dates are used for both pre and post event period time windows. 
Maximization of the above likelihood function involves numerical optimization. For 
some announcement events, the numerical algorithm does not converge. In this case, 
we delete such announcement events from our sample. Summary statistics of these 
PIN estimates are provided in the following section. 
 









2.4.1 Liquidity Trading Around Scheduled Versus Unscheduled 
Announcements 
 Before we proceed to our main empirical results, we'd like to show that there is 
indeed a dispersion in the amount of liquidity trading around scheduled versus 
unscheduled announcements. This is critical to our analysis since our hypotheses 
about profitability of insider trades and information asymmetry stem from liquidity 
trading patterns associated with such events. We rely on two recent findings in the 
literature to prove that this is indeed the case. Firstly, using turnover as a measure for 
trading volume, Chae (2005) showed that the time series pattern of turnover before 
unscheduled announcements exhibits clear differences from the pattern before 
scheduled (earnings) announcements. Instead of the negative abnormal trading 
volume seen before scheduled announcements, he observed positive abnormal trading 
volume prior to unscheduled announcements.  
Figure 2-1 provides a graphical summary of this striking difference in total trading 
volume around such announcement events. 
 
The above graph can be quite misleading in that the above trading volume is the total 
trading volume around such events. In other words, it could include both informed 
trading and liquidity trading around these periods. Before this trading volume can be 
translated reliably to liquidity trading, we need to assess how much out of the trading 
volume is due to informed trading. Given that informed traders are hardly recognized 
in reality, this is almost impossible. However, we do observe the trading volume that 
comes from corporate insiders. This should at least give us a rough idea of the 
proportion of total trading volume accounted for by insider trading. As documented 
by Jeng et. al. (2003), over their sample period from 1975 to 1996, the average 
monthly ratio of value-weighted insider sales to all trades is 0.22 percent, whereas the 
average monthly ratio of insider purchases to all trades is 0.03 percent. Thus, an 
outsider making a purchase would expect 0.22 cents per dollar to have an insider as 








to be with insiders. Consequently, it is relatively safe to argue that trading volume 
contributed by corporate insiders account for a fairly small proportion of the total 
trading volume. 
2.4.2 Profitability of Insider Trades 
 Having established that there is indeed time-varying liquidity trading around 
scheduled versus unscheduled announcements, we now turn to formal tests of the 
above four hypotheses. Our first hypothesis is mainly about the profitability of insider 
trades around such announcements. To the extent that corporate insiders trade more on 
their private information prior to unscheduled announcements than prior to scheduled 
announcements, insider trades before unscheduled announcements are more likely to 
be information-motivated than liquidity-motivated. Consequently, insider trades 
before unscheduled announcements are more profitable. 
 
To examine the profitability of insider trades, it is critical to choose an appropriate 
time horizon over which to cumulate stock returns. In our analysis, we mainly use six 
months horizon. We measure returns over a six-month period for three reasons. First, 
six months is the shortest plausible trading horizon for an insider because Section 
16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 stipulate that insiders must disgorge 
profits attributable to offsetting purchases and sales that occur within six months of 
each other. Second, several studies of US data find that abnormal returns extend for 
six or more months following insider trades. Thus, a return horizon of at least 6 
months is indicated. Third, while the abnormal returns that follow insider trades can 
be detected 12 or more months after the trade, the price effect is greatest immediately 
after the trade and is quite small in months 9 through 12 (Seyhun, 1998, p48). This 
suggests computing return over a horizon much longer than six months may introduce 
noise into our profitability measure. Combined altogether, these facts suggest that six 
months is a reasonable period over which to measure profitability of insider trades31. 
Jeng (2003) and Huddart et. al. (2006), among others, also employ six-month horizon 
                                                        








to examine the profitability of insider trading. 
2.4.3 Univariate Analysis 
 Table 2.1 provides the distribution of insider trades around such announcements. We 
examine three measures of insider trading activity: the number of trades, number of 
shares traded and value of shares traded. We use 30 calendar days to compute pre and 
post event insider trading activities32. One thing we immediately observe is that 
insider trading activity is more balanced around target and acquiror announcements as 
compared to earnings announcements. More specifically, the number of shares traded, 
total number of shares traded and total value of shared traded before target (acquiror) 
announcements all account for more than 40 (41) percent of the total insider trading 
activity around target (acquiror) events. In contrast, they only account for 18, 12 and 
10 percent of total insider trading activity respectively around earnings 
announcements. Moreover, this pattern is persistent for both insider purchases and 
sales. We think this is consistent with the notion that insiders' trading activity is less 
concentrated before earnings announcements as compared to target and acquiror 
announcements. 
 
Table 2.2 provides the mean market-adjusted returns over 6 months following trade 
dates. Panel A and Panel B of Table 2.2 computes the mean returns of insider trades 
over six months following the transaction dates. Returns are market-adjusted by 
subtracting the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ value-weighted index return from the raw 
returns. Several observations are in order. First, insider purchases, regardless of 
whether these purchases are conducted before or after the announcements, are always 
followed by positive returns. This is consistent with the notion that insiders tend to 
buy shares ahead of good news. Second, insider sales are followed by negative returns 
only when these sales are conducted before target and acquiror announcements. In 
contrast, insider sales are always followed by positive returns when these sales are 
                                                        
32The choice of 30 calendar days amounts to one month. We have also tried alternative definitions of 








conducted after the announcements of such events. While this finding is only partially 
consistent with the notion that insiders tend to sell shares ahead of bad news, several 
other researchers find the same pattern. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) also find that 
insider sales are not necessarily associated with low returns. Huddart et. al (2006) 
document that insiders sell after good news earnings announcements due to reasons 
such as litigation concerns. Aktas et. al. (2007) also find positive abnormal returns 
following insider sales33. 
 
More importantly, we notice that mean market-adjusted returns for insider purchases 
that are transacted before target and acquiror announcements, 8.37 percent and 6.84 
percent respectively, are higher than that before earnings announcements, which is 
only 4.15 percent, whereas the mean market-adjusted returns for insider purchases 
that are conducted after target and acquiror announcements, 2.03 percent and 4.26 
percent respectively, are lower than that after earnings announcements, which is 6.42 
percent. This suggests that at transaction level, insider purchases, on average, are 
more profitable when they are conducted before unscheduled announcements than 
before scheduled ones. And this pattern reverses for insider purchases after such 
announcements. In contrast, insider sales that are conducted before target and acquiror 
announcements are followed by a negative return of 1.06 percent and 2.83 percent 
respectively, whereas insider sales before earnings announcements are followed by a 
positive return of 1.84 percent. To the extent that insiders avoid loss when their sales 
are followed by negative returns, insiders gain more by selling before target and 
acquiror announcements than by selling before earnings announcements. Formal 
statistical tests show that the difference in means is mostly statistically significant at 5 
percent significance level. Thus, the most profitable purchases are insider purchases 
before target and acquiror announcements, followed by insider purchases after 
                                                        
33There are at lease two reasons why insider sales are followed by positive abnormal returns. First, 
insider sells are likely to be driven by other motives such as diversification and liquidity reasons rather 
than private information. See Lakonishok and Lee (2001), Jeng et. al. (2003) and Fidrmuc et. al. (2006) 
for more details. Second, insiders can have market timing ability, as shown in Jenter (2005) and 








earnings announcements. Insider purchases before earnings announcements and after 
unscheduled announcements are the least profitable trades, even though they are still 
followed by positive returns. In contrast, the most profitable sales are those conducted 
before target and acquiror announcements. On a semi-annual basis, insiders gain an 
additional 4.2 (2.9) percent of market-adjusted returns from purchasing (selling) 
before target announcements as compared to purchasing (selling) before earnings 
announcements. 
 
The above trade and return data are consistent with our main hypotheses: insider 
trades are more profitable before unscheduled announcements than before scheduled 
announcements. However, this univariate analysis suffers from several limitations. 
First, there are overlapping trades around scheduled versus unscheduled 
announcements. That is, some trades are classified as both trades around scheduled 
and unscheduled announcements. However, Panel B of Table 2.2 shows that this 
actually does not change our main findings. When non-overlapping trades are allowed, 
the results, if any changes, are actually stronger. Second, the transaction data are not 
independent. It is often the case that there are multiple trades per firm. Moreover, 
firms attributes (e.g., risk, firm size) related to these announcements may affect the 
documented returns, in addition to the hypothesized difference in insider trading 
strategies around such events. Accordingly, the return data in Table 2.2 should be 
viewed as descriptive and tentative. In the following section, we proceed to 
multivariate analysis to further investigate the cause of the difference in insider 
trading profitability. 
2.4.4 Cross-Sectional Multivariate Analysis 
We first examine whether the profitability of insider trades depends on the timing of 
such trades after controlling for certain firm and trade characteristics. The literature 
has documented a number of such characteristics that can affect the profitability of 
insider trades. First, insider trades in smaller firms are often more profitable than 








market capitalization around the time insider trades in our analysis. Second, Rozeff 
and Zaman (1998) document past returns are associated with the direction of insider 
trading activity and its profitability. They find that the proportion of buying 
transactions in insider trades is negatively related to prior stock returns. Taking this 
into account, we include the raw buy and hold return cumulated over a six-month 
period up to the transaction dates, PreRet6. Third, trading volume prior to insider 
trades might also provide camouflages for their trades (Kyle 1985, Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1988) etc) in addition to the timing of their trades. For this purpose, we 
include the standard deviation of daily trading volume, scaled by total shares 
outstanding, over a six-month period up to the transaction dates, StdVol. Our cross-
sectional transactional level regression specification is as follows:  
 0 1 2 3 4= 6i i i i iAbret SrcIdx LnMV StdVol PreRetβ β β β β ε+ + + + +          
 where SrcIdx is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the trade takes place 
around unscheduled announcements and 0 otherwise; LnMV is the natural log of the 
market value prior to the insider trades; PreRet6 is the raw buy-and-hold return over a 
six-month period up to the transaction dates; StdVol is the standard deviation of daily 
trading volume, scaled by total shares outstanding over a six-month period up to the 
transaction dates. 
 
Separate regressions are run conditional on the type of insider trades (purchases or 
sales) and timing of insider trades (before and after scheduled versus unscheduled 
announcements). Our predictions are that, controlling for other firm and trade 
characteristics that are known to affect the profitability of insider trades, slope 
coefficient estimates before the above indicator variables should be statistically 
significant. 
 
Table 2.3 provides the results for the above regressions. As we can see clearly from 
the table, slope coefficient estimates before firm size variable are always negative and 








statistically insignificant for insider sales. This is consistent with Seyhun (1998)'s 
findings, among others, that smaller firms tend to be subject to higher level of 
information asymmetry and hence insider trades in small firms are usually more 
profitable. We also notice that the slope coefficient estimates before the scaled trading 
volume variable are negative and statistically significant for insider sales. While they 
are always positive, they are only statistically significant for insider purchases that are 
conducted before the announcements. This suggests that insider purchases earn higher 
market-adjusted returns when these trades are conducted at times when the variation 
of liquidity trading increases, and hence, provides better camouflages. We interpret 
this evidence as consistent with the predictions of strategic trading models. 
 
To examine whether the timing of trades matters for the profitability of insider trades, 
we find that the the majority of the slope coefficient estimates before the indicator 
variables are statistically significant and the magnitude of these slope coefficient 
estimates are very close to the return differences in Table 2.2. For example, insider 
purchases before acquiror announcements, on average, earns an extra return of 2.7 
percent as compared to those before earnings announcements, which is close to 2.69 
percent as indicated in Table 2.2. Insider purchases after acquiror announcements, on 
the other hand, on average, earns an extra return of negative 2.17 percent, which is 
also close to negative 2.1 percent in the univariate case. In addition, the statistical 
significance is quantitatively the same after controlling those firm and trade 
characteristics that have been documented to affect insider trade profitability. 
 
2.4.5 Time-Series Multivariate Analysis 
 We also wish to examine the association between the profitability of insider trades 
around scheduled and unscheduled announcements and other risk factors. To 
accomplish this we construct several monthly portfolio conditional on the timing of 
the insider trades and the type of insiders' transaction (purchase or sale). These 








announcements; (2) PostEarnp for insider purchases that are conducted after earnings 
announcements; (3)PreTargetp, PreAcqp for insider purchases that are conducted 
before target and acquiror announcements; (4) PostTargetp, PostAcqp for insider 
purchases that are conducted after target and acquiror announcements. Similarly, 
PreEarns, PostEarns, PreTargets, PreAcqs, PostTargets and PostAcqs are constructed for 
insider sales around such announcement events. 
 
We calculate returns for each of the above portfolios as follows. For each calendar 
month (January 1993 through December 2005), we compute firm-specific mean raw 
returns over a six-month period following the transaction dates of insider trades that 
are defined as pre and post event trades. These firm-specific mean six-month-period 
returns are averages over all the individual insider trades that occurred during the 
month. We then compute calendar-time equally weighted portfolio returns over all the 
firms with insider trades in a given month, defined as the pre and post event trades in 
the above. We thus focus on the portfolio returns conditional on the timing of insider 
trades around such announcement events. 
 
To examine the extent to which the profitability of insider trades differ conditional on 
the timing of these trades, we employ an intercept test using the Fama-French model 
augmented with the well-documented momentum factor (MOM). The dependent 
variable is the difference between the calendar-time portfolio returns of insider trades 
conditional on the timing of such trades around scheduled and unscheduled 
announcements (PreTargetpt -PreEarnpt and PreAcqpt - PreEarnpt for insider purchases 
and PreTargetst - PreEarnst and PreAcqst - PreEarnst for insider sales). The independent 
variables are the four factors: market return, size, book to market and momentum 
factor. The regression equation is as follows. Similar regressions are run for portfolios 
formed conditional on insider trades around acquiror and earnings announcements. 
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Panel A of Table 2.3 provides the univariate raw returns of the constructed portfolios. 
Notice that these returns are raw returns instead of market-adjusted returns. As 
hypothesized above, the mean returns of the portfolios of firms that have insider 
purchases prior to target (acquiror) announcements are significantly higher than 
returns for portfolios of firms that have insider purchases prior to earnings 
announcements. Investing long in the target (acquiror) portfolio and short in the 
earnings portfolio yields a mean excess return of 7.55 (3.07) percent over a six-month 
period. What is different from the transaction level return is that this pattern persists 
after the announcement events. On average, PostEarnp continues to earn a lower 
return than PostTargetp and PostAcqp, even though the return differences become 
statistically insignificant. Looking at insider sales, the return difference between 
portfolios formed conditional on insider sales around scheduled and unscheduled 
announcements becomes statistically insignificant. Combined together, this suggests 
that insider purchases are more informative than insider sales around such events. And 
the timing of insider purchases also matters for portfolio performances. 
 
Panel B and C of Table 2.3 presents estimates from Fama-French four-factor model 
for the above two equations. As hypothesized above, the estimated intercept from 
time-series regressions of the difference in returns between target portfolios and 
earnings portfolios is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.02. And the estimated 
intercepts (8 percent) are close to the univariate returns in Panel A (7.55 percent). In 
contrast, the intercept estimate from the time-series regressions of the differences in 
returns between acquiror and earnings portfolios is only marginally significant with a 
p-value of 0.12, even though the magnitude of such return difference preserves the 
positive sign. Overall, this portfolio approach renders us less significant results. 
Nonetheless, insider purchase before target announcements indeed yield much higher 
returns than those before earnings announcements even at portfolio level. 
 
To sum up our main findings, we find that insider purchases before target 








announcements. And this much higher return is robust to firm and trade characteristics 
and risk factors. 
2.4.6 Information Asymmetry around scheduled versus unscheduled 
announcements 
Our previous analysis shows that insider purchases prior to unscheduled 
announcements are more profitable than those prior to earnings announcements. A 
direct corollary is that if insiders trade more heavily and profitably before 
unscheduled announcements than before earnings announcements, this relative 
concentration of informed trading should be inferred from the trading process. After 
all, private information only gets incorporated when informed traders execute their 
trades. In this sense, our second hypothesis provides a supplementary test as to 
whether insiders actually exploit their private information conditional on the time-
varying liquidity trading. 
 
Table 2.5 reports the mean and median PIN estimates obtained from maximizing the 
above equation (2) and (3). A 30-day event window is used to define pre and post 
event periods. The choice of this time window is based on early findings about the 
information leakage in the literature. Keown and Pinkerton (1981), Dennis and 
McConnell (1986) and Melbroek (1992) use a window covering the period from 20 
days before the announcement dates to one day before the announcement date. In 
contrast, Jabbour et. al. (2000) find insider trading occurring 45 to 60 days before the 
announcement dates. To the extent that we want to have enough number of trading 
days between consecutive earnings announcement dates for numerical optimization 
and convergence and also account for the fact that information leakage occurs 
primarily from -1 to - 45 days, we choose 30-day time window34. Estimating PIN 
requires the daily number of buys and sells for each event period. To obtain this 
statistic, we employ Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to sign each eligible trade for 
each trading day in the subject event period. As we can see from Table 2.5, on average, 
                                                        








PIN estimates ranges from 23 percent to 26 percent. This is very close to what others 
have obtained using similar or longer time window. We also notice that mean PIN 
estimates are a little higher before earnings and acquiror announcements than after. 
This is consistent with the notion that information asymmetry is higher before such 
events are made public. However, we also find that mean PIN estimates are much 
higher after target announcements than before such announcements. Though this 
result itself is puzzling, our finding is consistent with Aktas et. al (2007). These 
authors also find that PIN dropped before merger and acquisition announcements and 
increased after the information release35. 
 
Turning to Hypothesis 2, we notice that mean PIN estimates before target and 
acquiror announcements are always higher than those before earnings announcements. 
And these differences are always statistically significant at one percent significance 
level. Also the median of PIN estimates also have the same pattern. In untabulated 
tables, the differences in median are also significant. Interestingly, the mean and 
median of PIN estimates after target and acquiror announcements are also 
significantly higher than those after earnings announcements. Overall, this suggests 
that information asymmetry as captured by PIN is always higher around unscheduled 
announcements than around scheduled announcements. 
2.4.7 Trading Volume 
Our last two hypotheses are related to insider trading volume around scheduled and 
unscheduled announcements. After all, if insiders time their trades around such events, 
insider trading volume is indispensable in addition to the profitability of their trades. 
Table 2.1 in the above only provides summary statistics for three measures of insider 
trading activities. While insider trading activities are shown to be more intense and 
concentrated around unscheduled announcements, the evidence in Table 2.1 is far 
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from conclusive. We now turn to formal statistical tests of insider trading volume. 
 
To examine insider trading volume around announcement events, it is important to 
notice many factors may also play a role in determining how much insiders want to 
trade around such announcements, even though such trades are quite profitable. There 
are at least two factors that can affect insiders' desire to trade around material 
corporate announcement events. First, corporate restrictions and regulations prohibit 
insiders from trading in blackout periods. Bettis et. al. (2000) shows that such 
blackout periods successfully suppress trading by insiders and narrow bid-ask spread. 
The only exception to such blackout periods is the open trading window during the 
period three through 12 trading days after quarterly earnings announcements. Second, 
insiders have litigation risk and litigation concerns. Huddart et. al. (2006) argues that 
since insiders have discretion over whether and how much to trade, they tend to avoid 
risks stemming from jeopardies established by past regulatory actions, shareholder 
class-action suits and adverse publicity. 
 
To accommodate these factors and make insider trading volume comparable around 
earnings and target (acquiror) announcements, we examine abnormal insider trading 
volume defined over a different set of time windows around announcement events. 
Abnormal trading volume has been widely used in the literature as an indication of 
information leakage to control for other factors that affect normal trading volume in 
previous studies (Keown et. al. (1992), Meulbroek (1992)). To compute abnormal 
trading volume, the mean trading volume over some estimation window is usually 
subtracted from the trading volume in the event window. Similarly, we define four 
time intervals around each announcement, with the closest one being the event 
window and the three further ones being the estimation window. We subtract mean 
trading volume over the estimation windows from the trading volume in the event 
window to obtain our measure of abnormal trading volume. Also since we want to 
capture insider trading volume as a proportion of the daily stock trading volume to 








the shares traded by insiders divided by the daily share trading volume for that stock. 
 
Table 2.6 presents the computed mean abnormal trading volume around earnings and 
target (acquiror) announcements. Notice that these numbers are pretty small since 
they are measuring insider trading volume as a proportion of daily trading volume. As 
we can see clearly, the abnormal trading volume prior to all announcements are 
negative, which suggests that the closer it gets to the announcements, the less insider 
trades. We think this is consistent with the litigation risk hypothesis. After all, any 
immediate insider trades right before the announcement dates suffer more from 
adverse publicity and presumably, litigation risk for such trades are higher. 
Interestingly, abnormal trading volume increases substantially and become positive 
for earnings announcements, even though it remains negative for target and acquiror 
announcements. While this is consistent with Huddart et. al.(2007), among others, 
who find that insiders trade aggressively after earnings announcements, we think there 
are many plausible explanations. As suggested by Bettis et. al. (2000), many corporate 
insiders are essentially disallowed to trade except during the period three to 12 trading 
days after the earnings announcement dates. However, we want to point out that over 
all the different definition of event window, abnormal trading volume is always higher 
before unscheduled announcements than before earnings announcements. More 
importantly, this pattern is reversed after these announcements are made. Combined 
with the descriptive statistics provided in Table 2.1, we believe this constitutes strong 
evidence that insiders trade more heavily before unscheduled announcements and 
after earnings announcements. 
2.5 Conclusions 
 
This paper provides direct empirical evidence that insiders trade more aggressively 
and profitably around certain corporate announcements than around others. We find 
that insiders trade more heavily before unscheduled corporate announcements as 
compared to scheduled announcements. Moreover, insider trades before unscheduled 








This evidence clearly suggests that corporate insiders time their trades around 
material corporate information events based on the amount of liquidity trading 
available to camouflage their trades. We argue that the striking differences between 
the amount of liquidity trading available to camouflage their trades, as predicted by 









































Figure 2-1 Cumulative Abnormal Volume Around Announcement Events 
 
This figure plots the cumulative abnormal volume from t = -15 to t = 15 around scheduled 
and unscheduled announcement events. For each announcement, the benchmark average log 
turnover is computed from t = - 40 to t = -11 days, where turnover is defined as daily trading 










Table 2.1 Distribution of Insider Trades Jan 1993 - Dec 2005 
 
This table presents aggregate insider trading data around earnings, target and acquiror 
announcements. Number of trades, number of shares traded and dollar value of shares traded 
by corporate insiders are provided in Panel A, Pane B and Panel C respectively for both pre 







 Earnings Target Acquiror 
 Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Panel A. Number of Trades 
No. of Purchases 9447 37882 3624 4051 4797 6866 
No. of Sales 49373 237662 13431 18213 25034 35587 
Total No. of Trades 58820 275504 17055 22264 29831 42453 
Panel B. Number of Shares Traded 
No. of Shares 
purchased (MM) 
77.2 258.0 34.2 33.1 24.5 43.4 
No. of Shares 
sold (MM) 
372.4 3009.0 142.4 229.0 305.1 359.9 
Total No. of shares 
traded (MM) 
449.6 3267.0 176.6 262.1 329.6 403.3 
Panel C. Dollar Value of Shares Traded 
Val. of shares 
purchased (MM$) 
1056.2 3358.2 488.9 569.7 389.3 620.2 
Val. of shares 
sold (MM$) 
12055.7 114600.5 5394.1 8106.8 11220.9 13830.7 
Val. of shares 
traded (MM$) 








 Table 2.2 Average Market-Adjusted Returns of Insider Trades 
 
This table presents the average market-adjusted returns for insider purchases and sales over 
the 6 months following the transaction date. Panel A allows for overlapping trades between 
scheduled and unscheduled announcements. In Panel B there are no such overlapping trades. 
Market-adjusted returns are the raw returns minus the return on a value-weighted 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index. ***, ** and * denote that means or the differences in means 
are statistically significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. 
 
Panel A. Overlapping Trades 
 Insider Purchases Insider Sales 



















































Panel B. Non-Overlapping Trades 
 Insider Purchases Insider Sales 






























































 Table 2.3 Transaction-level Return Regression Controlling for Firm and Trade 
Characteristics  
 
This table presents the empirical results for the following regression specifications:  
 0 1 2 3 4= 6i i i i i iAbret SrcIdx LnMV StdVol PreRetβ β β β β ε+ + + + +  
 Separate regressions are run conditional on the type of insider transactions (insider 
purchases/sales) and the timing of insider trades (before/after scheduled and unscheduled 
announcements). SrcIdx is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the trade takes place 
around unscheduled announcements and 0 otherwise; LnMV is the natural log of market 
value prior to the insider trades; PreRet6 is the raw buy-and-hold return over a six-month 
period over to the transaction dates; StdVol is the standard deviation of daily trading volume, 
scaled by total shares outstanding, over a six-month period up to the transaction dates. Panel 
A compares trades around earnings and target announcements; Panel B compares trades 
around acquiror and earnings announcements. Robust standard errors are obtained from 
GMM estimates and p-values are reported in parentheses.  
 
Panel A. Comparing Target and Earnings Trades 
 

















































Panel B. Comparing Acquiror and Earnings Trades 
 































































Table 2.4 Portfolio Returns from Going Long on Insider Trading Around Unscheduled 
Announcements and Short Around Scheduled Announcements 
 
This table presents mean percentage raw returns earned on portfolios formed as follows: For each 
month between January 1993 and December 2005 we calculate, for each sample firm, the mean 
six-month raw returns following the transaction dates over all insider transactions during the 
month. We calculate the mean returns separately for firms that have insider trades around earnings, 
target and acquiror announcements. In Panel B and C, the intercept (alpha) of the augmented Fama 
French four-factor model in equation (5) is presented. It is the estimated intercept from a time-
series regression of the portfolio returns formed in the above on the market excess return, size, 
book-to-market and momentum factors. P-Values are reported in parentheses. 
 
Panel A. Univariate Portfolio Returns 
 Insider Purchases Insider Sales 
 Pre Post Pre Post 
Earnings Portfolio 10.53%  (<.001) 9.93% (<.001) 5.11% (0.02) 4.44% (0.002) 
Target Portfolio 18.08% (<.001) 13.78% (<.001) 6.08% (0.02) 5.70% (<.001) 
Acquiror Portfolio 13.60% (<.001) 10.59% (<.001) 5.54% (0.001) 5.81% (<.001) 
Target minus Earnings 7.75% (<.001) 3.85% (0.124) 0.97% (0.871) 1.26% (0.431) 
Acquiror minus Earnings 3.07% (<.001)    0.66% (0.124) 0.43% (0.001) 1.37% (<.001) 
Panel B. Four Factor Model: Pre Event Portfolios 
 Intercept Rmt - Rft SMBt HMLt MOMt Adj. R2 
 























































Panel C. Four Factor Model: Post Event Portfolios 
 






































































Table 2.5 Probability of Informed trading around scheduled and  
unscheduled announcements 
 
This table presents the mean and median of PIN estimates around earnings, target and 
acquirer announcements. A 30-day event window is used to define pre and post event period. 
To obtain these estimates, likelihood function as indicated in equation (2) is maximized using 
numerical algorithm. Lee and Ready (1991) is used to sign each eligible trades for each of the 
event period. The bottom two rows report the difference between these mean estimates.  
 
 Pre Post 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Earnings Announcements 0.234 0.206 0.231 0.203 
Target Announcements 0.252 0.222 0.261 0.227 
Acquiror Announcements 0.241 0.209 0.239 0.206 



















  Table 2.6  Abnormal trading volume around scheduled and unscheduled 
announcements 
 
This table presents mean abnormal trading volume around earnings, target and acquirer 
announcements. Panel A, B, C provides abnormal trading volume over a 30-day, 21-day, 14-
day event period respectively. To compute abnormal trading volume, subtract the mean 
trading volume over the 3 further estimation windows from the mean trading volume over the 
event window. The bottom two rows report the difference between these mean estimates. P-
values, based on robust standard errors obtained from GMM estimates, are reported in 
parentheses. 
 
Panel A: Abnormal Trading Volume: 30-day Event Window 
 Pre Post 
Earnings Announcements -0.0124 0.0045 
Target Announcements -0.0060 -0.0021 
Acquiror Announcements -0.0062 -0.0027 
Target minus Earnings 0.006 (<.001) -0.0067 (<.001) 
Acquiror minus Earnings 0.0062 (<.001) -0.0072 (<.001) 
Panel B: Abnormal Trading Volume: 21-day Event Window 
 Pre Post 
Earnings Announcements -0.0118 0.0055 
Target Announcements -0.0041 -0.0011 
Acquiror Announcements -0.0048 -0.0017 
Target minus Earnings 0.008  (<.001) -0.0066 (<.001) 
Acquiror minus Earnings 0.007 (<.001) -0.0072 (<.001) 
Panel C: Abnormal Trading Volume: 14-day Event Window 
 Pre Post 
Earnings Announcements -0.0055 0.0019 
Target Announcements -0.0021 -0.0012 
Acquiror Announcements -0.0033 -0.0012 
Target minus Earnings 0.0034 (<.001) -0.003 (<.001) 
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This paper studies informed trading in options markets around merger announcements. 
It is motivated by the following three considerations. 
 
The first consideration stems from the usefulness of the options market as a setting 
where informed trading can be better examined as compared to stock market. Existing 
literature has documented significant pre-takeover stock price runup on target stocks. 
Both illegal insider trading hypothesis and market anticipation hypothesis have been 
proposed to explain the price runup. While much has been done to investigate how to 
disentangle these two alternative hypotheses using anomalous stock returns and 
trading volume, less has been devoted to the options market to examine how 
anomalous option trading can help detect illegal insider trading. My paper makes the 
first attempt to bridge the gap. I argue that the options market provides an ideal setting 
to investigate informed trading for a number of reasons. First, while private 
information about the target stock is the same, the options market provides a whole 
package of instruments, i.e., options with different strike prices and maturities. In 
comparison, the stock market only provides one stock for informed traders to trade. 
Moreover, different option instruments with the same underlying are usually 
associated with different liquidity and leverage characteristics. This will certainly 
allow us to examine informed traders' trading strategies in greater depth and help 
increase our chances of recognizing informed trading ex post. Second, options 
provide higher leverage than stocks. Astute investors are more likely to use highly-








can be motivated by a variety of reasons such as media expectation, bidders' toehold 
strategies, event arbitrageurs and private information (Jarrell and Poulsen (1989)), 
whereas pre-takeover option trading is less subject to such different trading motives. 
Higher leverage and lower liquidity associated with the options market makes options 
speculative vehicle in nature. Merger announcement simply magnify this effect. 
 
The second consideration is related to the information event nature of merger 
announcements. I argue that merger announcements constitute the most natural events 
to study informed trading in options market for at lease three reasons. First, mergers 
often involve a change of corporate control and are usually associated with large and 
immediately realizable price premiums. Private information about merger deals is 
often material and potential awards from utilizing it are substantial36; second, neither 
the timing nor the magnitude of merger announcement is public information; third, 
extant literature has documented that illegal insider trading seems to be predominantly 
occurring in merger deals. In all, merger announcements present the most plausible 
setting where I can thoroughly examine how information and price are discovered 
through option trading around such events. 
 
My last consideration is motivated by the perceived increase in illegal insider trading 
around merger deals. This paper comes at a time when there is growing concern about 
whether illegal insider trading in merger deals has increased or not in recent years. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that this might be the case. For instance, Financial Times 
reports that suspicious trading ahead of US mergers and acquisitions has risen four-
fold in the past five years. Almost 60 percent of the 27 big merger deals announced in 
North America in 2006 were preceded by unexplained spikes in trading in the stock of 
the target company. As a matter of fact, the United States Senate Committee on 
Judiciary have held two hearings on Sept. 26, 2006 and Dec. 5, 2006 respectively to 
discuss how widespread illegal insider trading is and whether there is adequate 
                                                        
36On average, announcement returns are about 18 percent in my merger sample. Notice these abnormal 








enforcement against such illegal trading, especially considering the fact that hedge 
funds are becomingly increasingly involved in insider trading 37. As documented by 
Meulbroek (1992), about 80 percent of the illegal insider trading in her sample is 
related to takeover transactions. Thus, investigation of insider trading around merger 
announcements certainly captures a fairly large part of illegal insider trading and 
hence helps inform regulators. 
 
Using a broad sample of merger announcements, I find that there is abnormal option 
trading prior to such announcements after controlling for merger characteristics. This 
abnormal option trading is mainly concentrated in short-term and at-the-money 
options. Trading volume in these options leads stock market order imbalances and 
strongly contributes to the pre-takeover stock price runup. Implied volatility spread38 
calculated from these options is strongly positively associated with the abnormal 
option volume. Finally, I also investigate whether option trading volume can be used 
to predict takeover targets. I find strong predictive power of option volume for 
takeover targets. 
 
My paper is closely related to two separate brands of literature. First, the literature 
about the information content of option trading volume. Finance literature has 
established that option prices lead stock prices and option trading volume conveys 
information about future stock price movements (Manaster and Rendleman (1982), 
Easley, O'Hara and Srinivas (1998), Cao, Chen and Griffin (2005), Chakravarty and 
Mayhew (2005), Schlag and Stoll (2005), Pan and Poteshman (2006)). Unfortunately, 
existing studies have predominantly focused on regular times. Few papers have 
investigated informed trading in option market prior to significant information events 
such as merger announcements. Chakravarty et. al. (2004) find that on average option 
                                                        
37 For information about these two hearings see http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=2405 and 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=2437.  
38  Implied volatility spread is defined as call implied volatility minus put implied volatility.  It has been 
used an empirical proxy to capture the pricing pressure of calls relative to puts. I will dwell on its 








market's contribution to price discovery is about 17 percent in the sense of Hasbrouck 
(1995). However, their analysis is based on 60 most actively traded stock options 
from 1988-1992 at regular times. I suspect the level of price discovery will probably 
increase for option trading immediately prior to merger announcements. Similarly, 
Easley at. al (1998), Pan and Poteshman (2006) also find that their constructed option 
trading volume measure (positive versus negative volume in Easley et. al. and put-call 
ratios in Pan and Poteshman) predicts future stock returns at regular times. However, 
none of them cast their research questions around significant information events. 
 
Perhaps the only exception is Cao, Chen and Griffin (2005). They find that ahead of 
takeover announcements, the option market plays an important role in information 
revelation, whereas during normal market times, the stock market is the primary place 
of price discovery. My paper resembles their paper in that I also study option trading 
around merger announcements. However, my paper differs from theirs in two 
important aspects: first, I show that cross-sectionally, abnormal option trading volume 
immediately prior to takeover announcements is strongly positively associated with 
implied volatility spread, which I motivate as relative pricing of calls and puts. This 
association is especially strong for short-term and at-the-money (ATM) options. That 
is to say, short-term and ATM call options are becoming more and more expensive 
and experience the largest increase in trading volume simultaneously. I interpret this 
as strong evidence that price effect and volume effect are unified under the common 
roof of informed trading for these options. Second, I investigate directly whether 
option volume leads stock volume immediately before merger announcements. I show 
that relative option volume has strong predictive power on next-day stock market 
order imbalances. A one standard deviation increase in relative option volume leads to 
about 0.015 standard deviation increase in next-day stock market order imbalance. 
More interestingly, I show that this predictive power is especially strong for those 
mergers that have experienced accumulated implied volatility spread. 
 








paper examines the implications of option trading on stock price runup. Using a novel 
control for market anticipations, I show for the first time that abnormal option trading 
volume strongly contributes to the pre-takeover stock price runup in a cross-section of 
merger announcements. Thus, not only merger announcements affect how informed 
traders trade options, but also option trading shapes merger deals in return. Second, 
using a fairly large sample of 3,878 firms in an 11-year period, I estimate a hazard 
model that forecasts takeover targets using option trading volume as a predictor. The 
estimation result shows that option trading volume has strong predictive power on 
takeover targets even after controlling for a broad set of time-varying covariates. Thus, 
what happens in the options market can actually be used to predict whether firms will 
be acquired or not. This certainly has important implications for both practitioners and 
researchers. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I develop the main 
empirical hypotheses. Section 3 describes data sources for this study. I discuss the 
main results of empirical tests in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
3.2 Hypothesis Development 
 
 Option trading can be motivated by a number of reasons. Absent significant 
information events, liquidity reasons such as hedging and portfolio diversification 
might be the most common reason why both informed and uninformed traders trade 
options. In contrast, in the presence of large and significant information events, 
information reasons might be the driving force for option trading around such events. 
Option market is also the main venue for volatility information trading since traders 
with volatility information can only use non-linear securities such as options if they 
learn that stock price will change but they are not sure whether stock price will go up 
or go down39. In this section I intend to provide more background discussion on how 
                                                        
39An incomplete list of volatility trading literature includes: Whaley (1993), Chakravarty, Gulen and 








these different trading motives shape option trading in the context of merger 
announcements and formally derive my main hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is abnormal option trading volume in target stocks immediately 
prior to merger announcements. 
 
My first research question is: immediately before merger announcements, is there 
abnormal trading volume in options for target stocks? Motivation for this question is 
very simple. As mentioned in the introduction, existing literature (Easley et. al. (1998), 
Chakravarty et. al. (2004), Pan and Poteshman (2006) etc.) has documented that 
option market plays a role in price discovery and option trading volume carries 
information about future stock price movements in regular market times. This being 
the case, it is meaningful to examine the implications of option trading in a setting 
where a significant information event is pending.  I argue that a careful examination 
of option trading volume is the first step in understanding the implications of option 
trading around merger announcements. My first hypothesis formalizes this intuition. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Informed option trading volume is more likely to be concentrated in 
ATM and short-term options.  
 
Informed traders can choose to trade either stocks or options to take advantage of their 
private information. Whether informed traders choose to trade options is largely 
shaped by the trade-off between leverage and liquidity effects of trading in alternative 
markets. Easley et. al. (1998) among others shows that the market choice of informed 
traders is not a straightforward one. Both liquidity factor and leverage factor can enter 
into informed traders' choice of alternative markets. First of all, stock trading is 
generally more liquid. In contrast, options are generally thinly traded and bid-ask 
spreads in option markets are much wider (Vijh (1990)). Higher stock trading 
liquidity has two important implications for informed traders when they decide 








costs imply that execution costs for informed trading can be lower, and hence, a larger 
incentive for informed traders to trade stocks. Second, higher stock trading liquidity 
also provides a better camouflage for informed trading in the sense of Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1988). The higher stock trading liquidity is, the more likely informed 
traders choose to trade stocks for stealth trading40 purpose. Combined together, the 
liquidity arguments predicts that, all else equal, there should be an inverse relation 
between underlying stock trading liquidity and informed option trading around merger 
announcements. 
 
Secondly, option markets offer higher leverage as compared to the stock market and 
the downside risk when trading options is often limited. Black (1975) argues that 
informed investors may be attracted to the option market by the high leverage 
achievable through options. Consequently, this leverage effect implies that informed 
traders might prefer options to stocks, and hence, a positive relationship between 
option leverage and informed option trading. 
 
The above trade-off argument can be generalized to trading options with different 
strike prices in a similar fashion. This is because options with different strike prices 
are associated with distinct leverage and liquidity characteristics. More specifically, 
while out-of-the-money (OTM) options offer an informed trader the greatest leverage, 
bid-ask spreads and commissions also tend to be widest for OTM options. On the 
other hand, while ATM options provide mild leverage, bid-ask spreads also tend to be 
lowest. In contrast, in-the-money (ITM) options provide the least leverage. But 
commissions tend to be lowest for these options (Vijh (1990), Kaul et. al. (2002), 
Chakravarty et. al. (2004)). Chakravarty et. al. (2004) find that in regular market time, 
information shares estimates in the spirit of Hasbrouck (1995) average higher for 
OTM options across the 60 stocks in their sample from 1988-1992, which is 
consistent with the notion that leverage may be the primary force driving price 
                                                        
40 An incomplete list of the stealth trading literature includes Kyle (1985), Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), 








discovery in the options market. However, this does not necessarily rule out the role 
of liquidity effect. As further evidence, these authors also find that ATM information 
shares are higher, compared to OTM information shares when ATM options have high 
volume and narrow spreads as compared to OTM options. Thus, if informed traders 
value both liquidity and leverage, they will more likely choose to trade ATM options 
as compared to ITM and OTM options. 
 
Now let's consider option maturities. In general, short-term options are much more 
liquid than long-term options. More importantly, informed trader's private information 
about merger announcements is often short-lived and quickly gets incorporated into 
stock prices soon after the announcements are made. For these two reasons, I 
conjecture that any abnormal option trading volume immediately prior to merger 
announcements, if it is informed, will be mainly concentrated in short-term options. 
Hypothesis 2a formalizes this intuition.  
 
Hypothesis 2b: pricing effects and volume effects immediately before merger 
announcements are strongly correlated41. 
 
My second part of Hypothesis 2 is derived by investigating the simultaneity between 
pricing effects and volume effects before merger announcements. Gao and Oler (2004) 
also examine the simultaneity between pricing effects and volume effects in the stock 
market using a sample of merger announcements and find that there exists a non-
synchronicity between these two effects. More specifically, they find that higher-than-
normal volume precedes significant share price movement by about seven days in 
their merger sample. The reason is that over this period, active buyer-initiated trades 
are offset by active seller-initiated trades. They ascribe this pre-announcement selling 
                                                        
41It is noteworthy to point out that rejection of the second part of Hypothesis 2 does not necessarily rule 
out the possibility of informed trading. This is because informed traders may employ very sophisticated 
option trading strategies to prevent themselves from being recognized. Anand and Chakravarty (2003) 
present direct evidence that there is indeed stealth trading in option market. The propensity of stealth 








to arbitrageurs. My paper extends this analysis into option trading and examines the 
simultaneity between option pricing effects and option volume effect. I argue that the 
informed option trading hypothesis predicts simultaneity between the option pricing 
effects and trading volume effects. The reason is as follows. If abnormal option 
trading volume right before merger announcements mainly originates from informed 
traders, option prices should move concomitantly. After all, informed traders' private 
information will get incorporated into prices before the announcement dates. On the 
other hand, if abnormal option trading is spurred by other reasons such as hedging 
rather than information reasons, then option prices may or may not move in line with 
trading volume simultaneously. In particular, option prices may significantly lag 
option trading volume since volume that originates from liquidity motives does not 
carry new information in the first place. This constitutes my second part of 
Hypothesis 2.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Pre-takeover option trading volume leads stock volume.  
 
My third hypothesis examines the lead-lag relationship between option volume and 
stock volume around merger announcements. The literature has already investigated 
the lead-lag relationship between stock prices and option prices (Manaster and 
Rendleman (1982) etc), between option volume and stock prices (Easley et. al. (1998), 
Pan and Poteshman (2006) etc.). However, less has been devoted to the lead-lag 
relationship between option volume and stock volume. To the extent that it takes 
volume to move prices, a direct examination of the lead-lag relationship between 
stock and option volume certainly helps a understanding of the price discovery 
process. Theoretically speaking, stock volume can either lead or lag option volume 
depending on whether informed traders choose to trade stocks or options first. The 
detailed mechanism can be as follows. If informed traders choose to trade stocks first, 
what happens is that market makers in the stock market will observe an increased 
imbalance of order flow. More specifically, buy orders will outgrow sell orders to 








markets, they will have to sell stocks to informed traders. As a result, stock market 
makers will want to hedge their positions or maintain their desired inventory level. 
One thing they can do is that they can buy call options in the options market. 
Consequently, an increase in the stock market order imbalance will translate to an 
corresponding increase in option volume via market makers' market-making and 
hedging behavior. In other words, we will observe stock volume leads option volume 
if informed traders choose to trade stocks first. If on the contrary, informed traders 
choose to trade options first, then the above mechanism will reverse and we will 
observe option volume leads stock volume. Due to its information event nature, 
merger announcement provides a most natural setting where option volume is 
expected to lead stock volume.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Cross-sectionally, pre-announcement stock price runup should be 
higher for merger deals that have experienced larger abnormal option trading volume. 
 
My last two hypotheses aim at understanding the implications of option trading on 
merger deals per se from two different perspectives. More specifically, I first 
investigate whether and how pre-takeover option trading relates to pre-takeover stock 
price runup in merger announcements. Existing literature has documented significant 
stock price runup immediately prior to merger announcements (Keown and Pinkerton 
(1981), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Sanders and Zdanowicz (1992), Meulbroek (1992), 
Ascioglu et. al. (2002), King et. al. (2005)). Depending on data sample and time 
period, stock price runup index ranges from 27 percent to as high as 60 percent. Pre-
takeover stock price runup warrants its own discussion for at least two reasons. First, 
studies on pre-takeover stock price runup are meaningful for bidding firms. Schwert 
(1996) argue that pre-announcement stock price runup and takeover premia are 
generally unrelated. With no substitution between the runup and the markup, the 
runup is an extra cost to the bidders. Thus, it is economically important for bidders to 
explore the source of such significant stock price runup. Second, understanding what 








introduction, both market anticipation hypothesis and illegal insider trading 
hypothesis have been advocated in the literature to explain such significant stock price 
runup. If pre-bid runup is mainly driven by illegal insider trading, then it makes sense 
for securities regulators to spend more regulatory efforts to bring down such illegal 
trading. 
 
Surprisingly little has been done to understand whether and how option trading 
immediately before merger announcements affects the pre-bid runup. I extend the 
existing literature into the options market and directly test the above two alternative 
hypotheses. I argue that if information leakage is the main reason for pre-
announcement stock price runup and if abnormal option trading is spurred by 
informed traders, then in a sample where market anticipation about these mergers is 
controlled for, higher pre-announcement abnormal returns should be observed for 
those mergers that have experienced larger abnormal option trading volume. After all, 
higher informed option trading volume helps faster incorporation of leaked 
information into stock prices, thus leading to a higher pre-announcement abnormal 
return. This constitutes my hypothesis 4. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Pre-takeover option trading volume has predictive power on takeover 
targets. 
 
In my last hypothesis, I attempt to investigate whether option trading volume is 
predictive of takeover targets that have options traded on them. If pre-takeover option 
trading volume mainly stems from informed traders who have already learnt of the 
merger deals and traded in options market, then option trading volume immediately 
prior to merger announcements should have predictive power on whether firms will 
be announced to be acquired or not. Regardless of what kind of option trading 
strategies informed traders will adopt, aggregate option trading volume will 
nonetheless carry information about firms being takeover targets. It is in this sense 








trading volume in my survival analysis that is employed to forecast the takeover 
targets. I now formalize hypothesis 5 as follows: 
 
It is worthwhile to point out that the above hypotheses are closely related. More 
specifically, if informed option trading is mainly concentrated in short-term and ATM 
options as predicted by Hypothesis 2, I would expect that any positive results for 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 should be stronger for short-term options. More importantly, 
hypothesis 5 will flow naturally from the first four hypotheses. It is in this sense that I 
argue the power of my empirical tests actually relies on the joint support of the above 
five hypotheses. More about this will be discussed in the empirical section. 
 
3.3 Data and Methodology  
3.3.1 M & A Data 
Merger announcement data are obtained from SDC platinum M & A database. For a 
merger deal to be included in my sample, I impose several restrictions. First, I require 
that both target and acquiror firms be US public firms. Second, the dollar value of the 
merger deal is at least one billion US dollars. These two restrictions ensure that my 
research question will be examined in a setting where private information can 
possibly make the largest difference in relatively large merger deals. In total, 1919 
merger announcements with target stocks being optioned are obtained after these data 
filters from 1996-2006. 
 
It is known that announcement dates from SDC platinum Merger and Acquisition 
databases can be erroneous sometimes. Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) and Sanders and 
Zdanowicz (1992), among others, show that exact announcement date is critical to 
evaluate whether the pre-takeover stock price runup is due to illegal insider trading or 
market anticipations. To ensure that I have the precise announcement dates, I cross 








Schedule 13D and 14D-1 filing wherever applicable42 for each of the merger deal in 
my sample. I find that the majority of the SDC announcement dates for our sample are 
accurate. There are indeed a few cases where the SDC announcement dates are one 
day behind the 13D or 14D-1 dates. I replace them with the earlier dates in these cases. 
 
Since my research question aims at understanding how pre-takeover option trading 
impacts the way private information about these merger deals is incorporated into 
stock price, it is crucial to control for market expectation associated with these merger 
deals. This is because pre-takeover option trading can either be motivated by private 
information about these merger deals or by market anticipations about these deals. 
Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) find that the presence of rumors in the news media about 
an impending tender offer is the strongest explanatory variable in accounting for the 
pre-bid runup in the stock market. King and Padalko (2005) also find that pre-
takeover stock price-volume dynamics are more consistent with market anticipation 
than illegal insider trading. Consequently, it is reasonable to conjecture that pre-
takeover option trading could also be spurred by market rumors and anticipations 
about these deals. To control for market rumors and anticipations, I construct a Media 
variable as follows. I first obtain all the business news reports about the merger deals 
in Factiva database43 starting from one year ahead leading up to the announcement 
date. Any news report that includes: a report that a target firm is negotiating a change 
in control or seeking strategic alternatives, whether a buyer is named or not; an report 
that the target firm will look for buyer or merger partner to “maximize shareholder 
value”; a report that target firm's major shareholder intends to sell a controlling block 
of shares; a report that target firm had been negotiating a merger or takeover that 
failed earlier; a report that acquirer expresses a takeover intention; a report that target 
                                                        
42The SEC requires Scheduled 13D filings by five percent or more equity owners within 10 days of 
acquisition event. Schedule 14D-1 filings are required by the SEC at the time a tender offer is made to 
holders of equity securities of the target company if acceptance of the offer would give the bidder over 
five percent ownership of the subject securities. 
43 I search through the two main business news databases: the Wall Street Journal and Dow Jones News 








firms have been conducting stock repurchases with significant corporate control 
implications will make Media be coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. 
3.3.2 Stock Market Order Flow Data 
 Data on stock market order flow are obtained from NYSE Trade & Quote database. 
Standard Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm is employed to sign each trade. More 
specifically, a trade is a classified as a buyer/seller-initiated trade if the price is 
above/below the prevailing quote midpoint. For midpoint trades, tick tests are 
employed and buyer/seller initiation is classified if the most recent price change is 
positive/negative. For each firm in my sample, I compute a time-series of the stock 
market order imbalance going back to as far as 180 days before the announcement 
dates. 
3.3.3 Options Data 
 Volume data for option trading are obtained from OptionMetrics database. 
OptionMetrics provides daily trading volume for both calls and puts from Jan 1996 to 
December 2006. I match each optioned target stock into OptionMetrics by CUSIP 
numbers. OptionMetrics also provides the end-of-day trading volume for each option 
contract, which further allows me to compute the trading volume for options 
classified by maturities and moneyness44. 
 
Another important feature of OptionMetrics database is that it also provides implied 
volatility estimates for each traded option contract. According to the documentation 
file of OptionMetrics database, the implied volatility estimate is computed using a 
proprietary pricing algorithm that is based on the industry-standard Cox-Ross-
                                                        
44Following the standard practice in the literature, we classify options with maturities less than 60 days 
as short-term options. Options with maturities greater than 60 days are classified as long-term options. 
Option moneyness is defined as follows: call options are: in-the-money if strike price is less than 90 
percent of the underlying stock price; at the money if strike price falls between 0.9*stock price and 
1.1*stock price; out-of-the-money if strike price greater than 1.1*stock price. Similarly for put options. 
For robustness check I also experiment with cutoff levels 0.95 and 1.05 for moneyness definition. The 








Rubinstein (CRR) binomial tree model. Numerical optimization is run iteratively until 
the CRR model price of the option converges to its market price, which is the defined 
as the midpoint of the option's best closing bid and best closing offer prices. The final 
value of σ  is the option's implied volatility. 
 
Implied volatilities estimated this way accommodate underlying securities with either 
discrete or continuous dividend payments and American options with early exercise 
features. However, it is also noteworthy that these implied volatility estimates are 
model dependent. There can be an unknown bias in these estimates, especially 
considering the fact the market price is defined as the midpoint of the best closing bid 
and best closing offer prices. For this reason, I employ implied volatility spread in the 
following analysis. The notion is that a lot of the estimation bias in these volatility 
estimates might cancel each other out if I subtract the put implied volatility from the 
call implied volatility, thus leaving me a clean estimate of call option pricing relative 
to puts. I will further motivate the use of implied volatility spread in Section 4. 
 
OptionMetrics database also provides an exchange file that contains a historical 
record of changes to the active exchange for a security and new listing and delisting 
information. This file allows me to construct the takeover target prediction sample. 
Firms can drop out of my sample due to mergers and other reasons. Alternatively, 
firms may last throughout the sample period. Table 3.1 provides a detailed 
decomposition of the number of firms for each case. In total 3,878 firms are included 
in the final takeover target prediction sample. 
 
3.4 Empirical Results 
 
3.4.1  Abnormal Option Trading Volume 
 My empirical analysis starts from examining whether there is abnormal option 








volume. More importantly, I am interested in examining how pre-takeover option 
trading translates to informed trading after controlling for merger characteristics and 
underlying stock trading liquidity. 
 
Following the standard event methodology in the literature, I employ the fixed mean 
model to compute abnormal option trading volume. More specifically, [t-30, t+10] 
and [t-90, t-31] are defined as event window and estimation window respectively45. 
Normal trading volume is then computed over the estimation window by taking the 
average of the natural log of the raw trading volume46. Chae (2005), among others, 
argues that log transformation can make the trading volume variable closer to be 
normally distributed. Daily abnormal trading volume is computed by subtracting the 
normal trading volume from the daily trading volume in the event window. 
Cumulative abnormal trading volume is then computed by cumulating the daily 
abnormal trading volume over the 30 days leading up to the announcement dates. 
Abnormal trading volume for options with different maturities and moneyness are 
computed in a similar fashion. 
 
Panel a in Table 3.2 presents the abnormal trading volume for options conditional on 
maturities and moneyness. I provide the cumulative average abnormal option trading 
volume on target stocks for three samples: the whole sample, the sub sample where 
there is no media expectation and the sub sample where there is no acquiror's toeholds 
in target firms. By constructing these sub samples, I provide a preliminary control for 
two important factors that have been hypothesized to affect abnormal option volume 
around merger announcements: media expectation and acquiror's toeholding positions. 
I also compute the abnormal trading volume separately for calls and puts47. All the 
                                                        
45For a robustness check, I also experiment with a [t-20, t+10] for event window in all my empirical 
analysis. The main results remain unchanged. 
46See Lo and Wang (2000) for a comprehensive discussion of different trading volume measures. 
47Two reasons for us to separate call volume from put volume: first, the literature documents that puts 
are relatively less liquid than calls; second, takeover premium is more likely to have pricing pressure 








numbers are statistically significant at one percent significance level. 
 
Several results are immediately observed. First, for call options, the largest increase in 
cumulative abnormal trading volume occurs in ATM options, followed by ITM and 
OTM calls. Looking at options with different maturities, I observe that short-term 
calls experience a much larger increase in cumulative abnormal trading as compared 
to long-term calls. Moreover, the difference between options with different maturities 
is much wider than that for options with different moneyness. This is consistent with 
the notion that since informed traders' private information is short-lived, they will 
choose to trade short-term options before their private information gets public. Second, 
the above pattern is robust across the whole sample and the two sub samples. 
However, it does appear to be the case that media expectation about merger deals 
contributes to higher abnormal trading volume across options with different maturities 
and moneyness. Abnormal call option trading volume is indeed higher for the whole 
sample than for the no-media subsample. In contrast, the fact that the abnormal 
volume for the no-toehold subsample is a little higher than that for the whole sample 
seems to suggest that acquiror's toeholding actually tends to decrease the abnormal 
option trading. Third, notice that for put options with different moneyness and 
maturities, the abnormal option volume is much lower as compared to calls. This is 
consistent with the notion that calls are generally more liquid and hence, informed 
traders trade calls more than they trade puts to capitalize on their private information. 
Moreover, the largest increase occurs in OTM puts, followed by ATM puts. ITM puts 
experience the least increase in abnormal volume. Additionally, the difference in the 
increase between short-term and long-term puts is less striking as compared to calls. 
Overall, this is consistent with the notion that trading interests are more concentrated 
in calls as compared to puts around merger announcements. 
 
To assess the economic significance of the increase in cumulative abnormal option 
trading, notice that the numbers in Table 3.2 are in natural logs. To convert them back 








an example. The cumulative abnormal trading volume for short-term calls within 30 
days before the announcement date averages around ten million contracts. Such 
magnitude of accumulation in the trading volume is economically significant by all 
means48. Overall, the results in Table 3.2 suggest that there is abnormal option trading 
volume before merger announcements even after controlling for media expectation 
and acquiror's toeholds associated with such mergers. And this abnormal option 
trading volume is both statistically and economically significant, thus lending support 
to hypothesis 1. The fact that short-term calls experience much larger increase than 
long-term calls also provides initial support for informed option trading hypothesis49. 
 
The liquidity argument in the previous section argues that there should be an inverse 
relation between underlying stock trading liquidity and informed option trading. To 
investigate whether this is indeed the case, I compute the abnormal option volume, 
this time conditional on stock trading liquidity. Since liquidity has many different 
dimensions, many different liquidity measures have been proposed in the literature. 
Given that my research interests mainly lie in how stock trading liquidity affects 
informed traders' stealth trading purposes and better execution purposes, I use log 
volume as a proxy for stock liquidity50. More specifically, for each merger in my 
sample, I compute the average log volume over the benchmark period [t-240, t-60]. 
All firms are then sorted into five quintiles based on the average log volume over this 
period. I then compute the abnormal option trading volume for each quintile in a 
similar fashion. 
 
Cumulative abnormal option volume computed this way is presented in Panel b of 
                                                        
48 In comparison, the average trading volume for 100 most liquid options from 1996 to 2006 is 14,300 
contracts.  
49 As further evidence, I also compute the abnormal option trading volume conditional on both 
moneyness and maturities. Not surprisingly, I find that the short-term ATM calls experience the most 
significant increase in trading volume, followed by short-term ITM calls. 
50I also use an alternative proxy for liquidity: log turnover, defined as the natural log of the shared 








Table 3.2. As we can see clearly for call options, going from the least liquid quintile to 
the most liquid quintile, the cumulative average option volume decreases 
monotonically. The cumulative average abnormal option volume for quintile 1 (least 
liquid) is more than three times that for quintile 5 (most liquid). In addition, this 
pattern is robust across the whole sample, the no-media sample and no-toehold 
sample. In contrast, for put options, the abnormal option volume decreases, albeit not 
monotonically, as stock trading liquidity increases. Overall, these results strongly 
support the negative relation between stock trading liquidity and informed option 
trading and speak to the importance of controlling for underlying stock liquidity when 
I examine the determinants of abnormal option volume in multivariate analysis. 
 
To further relate the above abnormal option volume pattern to the option 
characteristics, I examine the liquidity and leverage associated with options of 
different moneyness and maturities. More specifically, I use option delta as a proxy 
for option leverage and log volume as a proxy for option trading liquidity. Again, I 
compute these two metrics over the benchmark period [t-240, t-60]. Table 3.3 presents 
the cross-sectional averages of the time-series averages for both option delta and log 
volume. Not surprisingly, I find that indeed, ATM options are associated with mild 
leverage and highest liquidity. While OTM options provide the greatest leverage, it is 
also the least liquid. In comparison, ITM options offer the least leverage and are more 
liquid at the same time. Additionally, this leverage-liquidity characteristic is robust 
across both calls and puts. For options with different maturities, I observe that short-
term options are more liquid than long-term options. And this is true for both calls and 
puts. While short-term calls have slightly lower leverage than long-term calls, short-
term puts have higher leverage than long-term puts.  Figure 3-1 provides a graphical 
representation of the options within different maturities and moneyness on the 
leverage-liquidity quadrant. These leverage and liquidity characteristics, combined 
with the abnormal option volume pattern, is strongly consistent with the notion that 









3.4.2 Simultaneity Between Pricing Effects and Volume Effects 
The previous section establishes that there is abnormal option trading volume 
immediately before merger announcements. The distribution of abnormal volume 
across options with different moneyness and maturities lends initial support to the 
informed option trading hypothesis. In this section I motivate one important measure 
of relative option pricing: implied volatility spread. I further investigate the 
simultaneity between this pricing measure and the abnormal option volume to test the 
hypothesis 2b. 
 
Implied volatility is now a widely accepted paradigm for empirical tests of option 
valuation (Jarrow and Wiggins (1989)). Implied volatility spread is defined as the call 
implied volatility minus put implied volatility. The motivation of using implied 
volatility spread as a measure for the relative pricing of call and put options is as 
follows: under perfect market conditions and for a given maturity date, the volatility 
implicit in call options must be equal to the volatility implied in put options. On the 
other hand, higher called-implied volatility relative to put-implied volatility indicates 
that calls are overpriced relative to puts. Therefore I can measure the relative 
overpricing or underpricing of call and put options by their implied volatilities51. In 
my context, positive implied volatility spread is alternatively interpreted as additional 
pricing pressure on calls relative to puts right before announcement date. 
 
Implied volatility spread is an ideal measure to capture the pricing pressure in option 
market prior to takeover announcements. This is because merger announcements have 
been documented to have directional implications on the stock price movements. 
Target stocks often experience significant takeover premiums. If informed traders 
choose to trade options to utilize their private information, the directional move in 
target stock prices will certainly be reflected in the relative overpricing of call options. 
                                                        
51A similar procedure has been adopted by Figlewski and Webb (1993) to investigate the pricing 









More specifically, call options will be more expensive relative to puts if target stock 
price is expected to increase substantially in the near future. Consequently, I can 
expect there is an accumulation of implied volatility spread immediately prior to 
takeover announcements. 
 
Previous literature suggests that option pricing models systematically misprice 
options with respect to maturity and moneyness (Whaley (1982), Stein (1989) and 
Bakshi et. al. (1997)). Short-term options are typically underpriced by Black-Scholes 
relative to long-term options. Similarly, deep in-the-money and deep out-of-the 
money options are underpriced relative to at-the-money options. Consequently, I need 
to control for option moneyness and maturities when I employ implied volatility 
spread as a pricing pressure measure. To achieve this purpose, I sort each traded 
option contract by maturity and moneyness. Call and put options are then matched by 
the same underlying stock price, maturity and moneyness. I then subtract the put-
implied volatility from the call-implied volatility to obtain my estimate of the implied 
volatility spread for each matched call and put pair. Implied volatility spreads are 
averaged by maturity and moneyness to obtain a daily series for each target stock. I 
also compute the implied volatility spread from long-term/short-term options, 
ITM/ATM/OTM options in a similar fashion. 
 
To capture the accumulation of implied volatility spread, I compute the abnormal 
implied volatility spread as follows: for each day in the event window ([t-30, t+10]), I 
first take the average of the implied volatility spread in the prior 60 days. I then 
subtract the average from the implied volatility spread in the event window. These 
abnormal volatility spreads are then cumulated over the event window.  
 
Figure 3-2 plots the cumulative abnormal implied volatility spread for the whole 
sample, the no-media subsample and no-toehold subsample. As we can see clearly, 
there is an obvious accumulation of the implied volatility spread immediately prior to 








spread keeps increasing before the announcement dates and reaches the highest level 
around announcement dates. Thus, calls are indeed overpriced relative to puts right 
before the announcement dates. 
 
I further examine what kind of option contracts experience the accumulation of the 
implied volatility spread before announcement dates. As predicted by the informed 
option trading hypothesis, short-term calls are more likely to attract informed traders 
than long-term calls due to its liquidity and leverage characteristics, hence I expect the 
accumulation of implied volatility spread to be concentrated in short-term options. 
Similarly for options with different moneyness, ATM calls are more likely to attract 
informed trades due to its leverage and liquidity characteristics as shown in Table 3.3. 
Hence, I expect the accumulation of implied volatility spread to be more striking in 
ATM options than for ITM and OTM options. 
 
In Figure 3-3, I plot the computed cumulative abnormal implied volatility spread for 
option contracts classified by moneyness and maturity for the whole sample 52 . 
Interestingly, I find that the accumulation of the implied volatility spread is indeed 
concentrated in ATM options. In contrast, accumulation of the implied volatility 
spread is less obvious for ITM and OTM options. Moreover, visual examination 
clearly shows that the accumulation of volatility spread is even more striking for 
short-term options than for long-term options. Thus, short-term and ATM calls are 
becoming more and more expensive immediately before merger announcements. This 
is consistent with the notion that informed traders' concentrated trading in these 
options exerts the largest pricing pressure on these options. 
 
So far, the above graphical results demonstrate that short-term and ATM call options 
are encountered with the largest pricing pressures before announcement dates. 
However, the above evidence is at most descriptive and qualitative. More importantly, 
                                                        
52Results are similar for the no-media subsample and no-toehold subsample. For brevity reasons I do 








it is silent as to whether and how this pricing pressure on call options is related to 
abnormal option trading volume over the event period. To formally examine the 
simultaneity between the pressure and the volume effect, formal statistical tests are 
necessary. In what follows I employ regression analysis. My regression specification 
is as follows:  
=opt stkCumAbvol Media Toehold StkLiq OrderFlow Volspreadα β γ η ω υ ε+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
Where Media is the constructed media variable that takes the value of one if there is 
news report about the merger deal one year ahead of the announcement date and zero 
otherwise; Toehold is acquiror's toeholding position in target firms; StkLiq is the log 
volume over the benchmark period [t-240, t-60] proxying for underlying stock trading 
liquidity; OrderFlowstk is the cumulative stock market order imbalance defined as 
buyer-initiated volume minus seller-initiated volume; Cumabvolopt is the cumulative 
abnormal option volume; Volspread is the computed cumulative abnormal implied 
volatility spread. 
 
The above independent variables are motivated by factors that may affect abnormal 
option trading volume immediately before merger announcements. First of all, if there 
is market anticipation about the merger deal ahead of the announcement date, higher 
abnormal option trading volume might be expected from Jarrell and Poulsen (1989). 
In addition, cumulative option volume could also be affected by acquiror' toeholding 
positions in target firms as shown in the above univariate results. Secondly, it is 
crucial to control for the stock market order flow imbalances given that there are 
many channels through which stock trading volume relates to option trading volume. 
For instance, informed traders trade in stock market and hence market makers hedge 
their positions in options market. More importantly, as I argue in Section 2, the 
informed option trading hypothesis predicts simultaneity between the relative pricing 
of calls versus puts and the cumulative abnormal option trading volume. Consequently, 
I expect the slope efficient estimates before Volspread to be positive and significant. 








stronger for implied volatility spread computed from short-term and ATM options. 
 
Table 3.4 presents the estimation results for the above regression specification. I 
estimate a total number of 6 models, which differ from each other in the Volspread 
variable. More specifically, Volspread variable in model 1 is computed from the 
whole sample, whereas in Model 2 to Model 6 the Volspread is computed from ITM, 
ATM, OTM, short-term and long-term options respectively. 
 
Several observations are immediately noticed. First, the slope efficient estimates 
before Media variables are positive and statistically significant except for model 6, 
where the Volspread variable is computed from long-term options. Thus, I do find 
evidence that news report and media coverage about merger deals stimulate trading 
volume in options market. This is consistent with the univariate result in Table 3.2 
where cumulative abnormal option volume for the no-media sample is lower than that 
for the whole sample; Second, the slope coefficient estimates before Toehold are 
negative and statistically significant for the whole sample and for model 5 and 6 
where Volspread is computed from short-term and long-term options. Again, this 
negative sign is consistent with the univariate results in Table 3.2; Third, the slope 
coefficient estimates before the stock trading liquidity variable StkLiq are always 
negative and statistically significant except for model 2, where Volspread is computed 
from ITM options. Hence, lower option volume is usually associated with higher 
stock trading liquidity. This is consistent with both the univariate results and the 
predictions of the liquidity argument. Fourth, the OrderFlowstk variable that captures 
the stock market order imbalances is always positive and significant. Hence, higher 
stock market order imbalance is associated with higher cumulative abnormal option 
volume. This is quite intuitive given that pre-takeover trading volume in these two 
markets is strongly correlated. However, it is unclear whether stock volume leads 










More importantly, I notice that even after I control for the above merger 
characteristics and stock market order imbalances and liquidity that have been shown 
to affect abnormal option volume, the slope coefficient estimates before my focal 
variables are always positive and statistically significant except for Model 2, where 
this variable is computed from ITM options. Thus, higher abnormal option volume is 
associated with larger cumulation of implied volatility spread, indicating that calls 
become more expensive and volume increase more at the same time. These results 
constitute favorable evidence that short-term and ATM option pricing pressures are 
strongly correlated with abnormal option trading volume. Overall the above graphical 
results and regression analysis lend strong support to the predictions of the informed 
option trading hypothesis that pricing effects and volume effects are unified under 
informed option trading for ATM and short-term options. 
 
3.4.3 Option Volume Leads Stock Volume 
 The previous two sections show that abnormal option volume pattern is consistent 
with informed option trading hypothesis. However, it does not address whether price 
is first discovered in stock market or options market. Option volume leading stock 
volume would certainly reinforce the above results. In this section, I test directly the 
lead-lag relation between stock volume and option volume. 
 
To capture what is taking place in the stock market around merger announcements, I 
propose a metric of stock market order imbalance, StkOrderFlow, defined as the 
difference between buyer-initiated volume and seller-initiated volume. This metric is 
more appropriate as compared to raw stock volume given that I am not interested in 
the total shares traded, but rather how buy/sell orders become out of balance as a 
result of informed trading and how this order imbalance relates to option trading. To 
capture the options market, I also propose a metric of relative option volume, OptVol, 
defined either as short-term volume minus long-term volume or ATM volume minus 








findings that short-term and ATM options exhibit the largest increase in abnormal 
volume before merger announcements. Consequently, I argue that short-term and 
ATM volume, net of long-term and ITM/OTM volume, is more meaningful in that it 
sifts out any possible maturity or moneyness effect when I examine the 
informativeness of option volume53. I then estimate the following regression:  
1 1 2 1= , [ 30, 1]t t tStkOrderFlow StkOrderFlow OptVol t t tα β β ε− −+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ∈ − −    
where StkOrderFlow and OptVol are stock market order flow and relative option 
volume respectively. 
 
Since for each event in my sample, at most I have 30 observations, to increase the 
statistical power, I pool all the observations together. For this purpose, I first 
standardize both the stock market order flow imbalance series and relative option 
volume series using its mean and standard deviation over the benchmark window [t-
150, t-30]. Cao et. al. (2005) also standardizes their option volume series using a 
similar procedure. I control for the lagged stock market order imbalance since the 
literature has documented that stock market order flow tends to be positively 
autocorrelated. 
 
Panel A in Table 3.5 provides the estimation results for the whole sample. I report 
each of the two relative option volume series. Notice first that stock market order 
imbalances are positively autocorrelated. A one standard deviation increase in stock 
market order imbalances leads to about 0.090 standard deviation increase in next-day 
order imbalance. This is consistent with what the literature has documented. More 
importantly, after controlling for lagged stock market order imbalances, the slope 
coefficient estimates before the lagged relative option volume are always positive and 
statistically significant for both relative option volume series. On average, a one 
                                                        
53 Ideally, I would like to use option market order flow imbalance similar to StkOrderFlow . 
However, this requires high-frequency option trade & quote data, which unfortunately is not available. 
For robustness check I also use log volume for short-term, long-term, ITM, ATM and OTM options and 








standard deviation increase in lagged relative option volume leads to about 0.015 
standard deviation increase in next-day stock market order imbalance. Thus, option 
volume indeed leads stock volume for the mergers in my sample. This complements 
Cao et. al. (2005) and speaks to the informativeness of option volume before merger 
announcements. 
 
To further investigate the source of the predictive power of relative option volume and 
relate it to the pricing effects as measured by implied volatility spread, I cut the 
sample into two sub samples based on whether there is accumulation of implied 
volatility spread. Panel B and Panel C in Table 3.5 report the estimation results for 
these two sub samples. As we can see clearly, both the magnitude and the statistical 
significance of the predictive power decrease substantially for the sub sample where 
there is no accumulation of implied volatility spread. In sharp contrast, lagged relative 
option volume series are always positive and highly significant when there is 
accumulation of implied volatility spread. On average, a one standard deviation 
increase relative option volume results in 0.021 standard deviation increase in next-
day stock market order imbalances. Overall, I interpret this as strong evidence that 
option volume leads stock volume the most when there is simultaneous pricing effects 
as indicated by the implied volatility spread. 
3.4.4 Implications of Option Volume on Mergers Per Se 
In this section I examine how pre-takeover abnormal option trading affects merger 
deals per se. More specifically, I investigate both how option trading affects pre-
takeover stock price runup and whether option trading volume has any predictive 
power on takeover targets. Investigation of the implications of option trading on stock 
price runup is meaningful for at least bidding firms. Schwert (1996) argues that there 
is no association between pre-bid stock price runup and the post-announcement 
increase in the target's stock price (the markup). Consequently, runup is an added cost 
to bidding firms. Thus, if option trading accounts for the pre-bid runup, option trading 








trading volume can be used to predict takeover targets is of vital interests for both 
market professionals and ordinary investors given that mergers often induce 
significant stock price movements. 
 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that in a cross section of merger announcements, higher pre-
announcement returns should be observed for mergers that have experienced larger 
abnormal option trading if option trading mainly originates from informed traders. 
This is because information contained and hence revealed in option trading will be 
incorporated into stock prices before the announcement dates. 
 
To compute abnormal returns, I follow the standard event study methodology. Event 
window is defined as [t-30,t+10]. A market model is then estimated using estimation 
window data running from [t-240, t-31]. Market model parameter estimates are then 
applied to compute abnormal returns. Daily abnormal returns are then cumulated over 
the the time period 30 days before the announcement date to obtain the prior 
cumulative abnormal returns. The following regression equation is then estimated:  
 = stk optPriorRet Media OrderFlow Cumabvolα β γ η ε+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +          
Where PriorRet is the computed cumulative abnormal returns over the pre-
announcement period; OrderFlowstk and Cumabvolopt are stock market order 
imbalances and cumulative abnormal option volume respectively. Media is the 
constructed media variable that captures the market anticipations of the merger deals; 
The above explanatory variables are motivated as follows. Stock market order 
imbalance is incorporated since I want to investigate whether stock market order 
imbalance before merger announcement is conducive to stock price runup in the 
presence of option trading volume. The fact that option trading volume leads stock 
volume does not necessarily rule out the role of stock trading volume. It is possible 
that stock market order imbalance also conveys information about the forthcoming 
merger deals. Thus, while I expect the sign of this variable to be positive for pre-








Larger media coverage and massive market anticipations certainly help discover the 
price and hence, I expect a positive sign for the Media variable. 
 
Estimation results are presented in Table 3.6 for pre-announcement return equation. 
which differ from each other in the Cumabvolopt variable. More specifically, 
Cumabvolopt variable in model 1 is computed from the whole sample, whereas in 
Model 2 to Model 6 the Cumabvolopt is computed from ITM, ATM, OTM, short-term 
and long-term options respectively. 
 
Notice that: (1). Media variable is usually positive but only statistically significant for 
pre-announcement returns for Model 4 and Model 6. Thus, I find weak evidence that 
media coverage and market anticipations do help spread the word about the 
forthcoming merger deals and contribute to the pre-takeover stock price runup. (2). 
OrderFlowstk is always positive and statistically significant in explaining the pre-
announcement returns across all the models I have estimated, which suggests that 
higher pre-takeover stock market order imbalance does lead to higher stock price 
runup in the stock market. (3). More importantly, Cumabvolopt is always positive and 
statistically significant except for Model 4, where this variable is computed from 
OTM options. Furthermore, I notice that the magnitude of the slope coefficient 
estimates for short-term options is larger than that for long-term options. While the 
slope coefficient estimate before ATM options is smaller than that before ITM options, 
it is significant at one percent level. Combined altogether, this provides strong 
supportive evidence that abnormal option trading volume is conducive to pre-takeover 
runups and the contribution mainly stems from short-term and ATM options. 
 
3.4.5 Forecasting Takeover Targets Using Option Volume 
Hypothesis 5 predicts that informed option trading volume is predictive of takeover 
targets. To test hypothesis 5, I employ a hazard model to forecast takeover targets 








risk of being taken over changes through time and its survival is a function of its latest 
financial data. As argued by Shumway (2001), hazard models are econometrically 
more appropriate than single-period model in forecasting corporate events such 
bankruptcy or mergers for a number of reasons. First, traditional static model fails to 
control for each firm's period at risk. Hazard model automatically adjusts for the fact 
that some firms are taken over after many years of being at risk while other firms are 
acquired in their first year; second, hazard model exploits each firm's time-varying 
data by including monthly observations as time-varying covariates. Hazard model 
allows each firm's financial data to reveal its changing risk of being acquired; third, 
hazard model is also more preferable in that it may produce efficient out-of-sample 
forecasts by utilizing much more data. It is for these reasons that I rely on hazard 
model in forecasting takeover targets in the following. More specifically, my hazard 
model specification is as follows:  
0( ) = ( ) exp( )optH t H t Vol Controlsα β⋅ ⋅ + ⋅  
 where H0(t) is the baseline hazard at time t representing the hazard for the firm being 
taken over with value 0 for all the predictor variables; Volopt and Controls are monthly 
option trading volume and a set of time-varying predictors reflecting the firm's 
financial data and thus its changing risk of being taken over. 
 
Control variables in the above model specification are motivated by economic 
theories. Palepu (1989) searches an exhaustive list of both financial and accounting 
predictors based on economic stories. My sets of predictors are determined in a 
similar fashion. More specifically, I include the following control variables in the 
hazard model estimation 54 : (1). Firm size. Economic theories suggest that the 
likelihood of being acquired decreases with the size of the firm. This is because there 
are several size-related transaction costs associated with acquiring a firm. These costs 
are likely to increase with the target size. Hence, I expect the size variable to be 
                                                        
54I also experiment with several other accounting and financial variables including leverage, return on 
equity and price-earning ratios. These variables are not significant at all even in the univariate hazard 








negative; (2). book-to-market ratios. Firms whose market values are low compared to 
their book values are likely acquisition targets. Growth firms are more likely to be 
``cheap'' buys. Hence, I expect the book-to-market variables to be positive; (3). Stock 
returns. The inefficient management hypothesis argues that firms with bad 
management are likely targets. If stock returns are used as proxies for management 
efficiencies, then a negative sign is expected of this variable; (4). stock trading 
volume. This variable is included for the obvious reason that volume in the stock 
market and options market might be correlated. (5). Open interest. This variable is 
motivated by business news that report significant change in open interest in options 
market immediately prior to merger announcements. 
 
Estimation results for the hazard model are provided in Table 3.7. Several 
observations are in order. First, parameter estimates for Mktcap variable are negative 
and statistically significant. Thus, smaller firms are more likely to be acquisition 
targets; second, slope coefficient estimates for Btm variables are positive and 
significant across all the models I estimated. Thus, growth firms are more likely to be 
acquired; third, parameter estimates for StkVol are positive and significant. Thus, 
anomalous trading in the stock market can be indicative of a forthcoming merger; 
fourth and more interestingly, slope coefficient estimates for Ret are positive and 
significant. Thus, it seems to be the case that firms with better performance in the 
stock market are likely acquisition targets. This is opposite to what has been expected 
if stock returns are viewed as a proxy for management efficiency. I think one possible 
explanation might be that firms with strong performance in the stock markets might 
catch attention from potential acquirors for the consideration that acquisition of such 
firms implies immediately available cash flows. More importantly, I find that 
parameter estimates for my focal variable Volume are positive and statistically 
significant for the whole sample as well as for option volume computed from options 











 This paper documents that abnormal option trading immediately before merger 
announcements contains private information about the merger deals. Informed traders 
do trade options to capitalize on their private information and their private 
information gets revealed through option trading. I show that such information 
revelation is mainly achieved through short-term and ATM call options. The 
simultaneity between the pricing pressures on these call options and the large increase 
in abnormal trading volume, along with the fact that option volume leads stock market 
order imbalances, further corroborates this informed option trading story. More 
importantly, I show that this abnormal option trading has important implications for 
both pre-bid stock price runup and takeover target predictions. The fact that larger 
pre-takeover abnormal option trading volume is associated with higher stock price 
runup, combined with the fact that pre-takeover stock price runup is an added cost to 
the bidding firms, implies that bidders should at least keep an close eye on option 
trading in target stocks immediately before the public announcement. It makes sense 
for them to investigate whether there is serious information leakage about the merger 
deals and how this can affect the way they structure the merger deals. Moreover, using 
a sound econometric model, I show that option trading volume can actually be used to 
predict whether firms will be acquired or not. I believe this is the first paper that 
shows the implications of option trading on takeover target predictions. 
 
At least the following three questions can be further examined in future studies. The 
first question is, to what extent is the level of price discovery in merger context 
different from that in regular market times? An answer to this question will certainly 
help us achieve a understanding of the price discovery process both around significant 
information events and in ordinary times. While the evidence presented in this paper 
seems to suggest that information shares in the spirits of Hasbrouck (1995) might be 
higher for option trading around significant events, high-frequency data are required 








perspective, how is the private information discovered through the option trading 
process? While the results in this paper prove that such information is indeed revealed 
before announcement date, it is silent on how market makers recognize the increased 
probability of informed trading and hence adjust their quoting strategies. It is also 
unclear how other liquidity traders might respond to informed trading. Third, how is 
option trading related to stock trading around merger announcements? Is it simply that 
informed traders choose to trade options when there is a significant information event 
pending? Or is there much more interesting and complicated interaction between 
trading in these two different markets? While this paper demonstrates that abnormal 
option trading is informative in that it predicts stock market order imbalances, it is 
agnostic on any detailed mechanism that links stock and option trading in a way that 
generates further insights into multi-market trading around information events. I 









 Figure 3-1 Leverage and Liquidity Characteristics for Calls and Puts 
  
This figure presents the leverage and liquidity characteristics for options with different 
moneyness and maturities. The X-axis represents option trading liquidity and is defined as the 
natural log of the raw trading volume over the benchmark period [t-240, t-60]. The Y-axis 
represents option leverage and is defined as option delta. Cross-sectional averages of these 
two metrics are computed for short-term, long-term, ITM, ATM and OTM respectively. 
Figure 3.1a presents call options and Figure 3.1b presents the put options.  
 
Figure 3.1a Call Options 
 















Figure 3-2 Cumulative Abnormal Volatility Spread Immediately  
Prior to Takeover Announcements 
  
This figure presents the cumulative abnormal volatility spread immediately prior to the 
takeover announcements in my sample. Volatility spread is defined as call implied volatility 
minus put implied volatility. Call options and put options are matched by the same underlying 
stock, strike prices and maturities. Figure 3.2a presents the cumulative abnormal volatility 
spread for the whole sample. Figure 3.2b and Figure 3.2c present the cumulative abnormal 
volatility spread for those takeover announcements where no media expectation about the 
merger deal is present and where acquirors have no toehold positions in target firms.  
 
Figure 3.2a All Sample 
 
Figure 3.2b Controlling for Media Expectation 
 
 






















  Figure 3-3 Cumulative Abnormal Volatility Spread Immediately Prior to Takeover 
Announcements Conditional on Option Moneyness  
  
This figure presents the cumulative abnormal volatility spread immediately prior to the 
takeover announcements conditional on option moneyness. Volatility spread is defined as call 
implied volatility minus put implied volatility. Call options and put options are matched by 
the same underlying stock, strike prices and maturities. Figure 3.3a, figure 3.3b and figure 
3.3c presents the cumulative abnormal volatility spread computed from ITM, ATM and OTM 
options respectively. Figure 3.3d and figure 3.3e presents the cumulative abnormal volatility 
spread computed from short-term and long-term options respectively.  
Figure 3.3a In-the-Money Options 
 













Figure 3.3c Out-of-the-Money Options  
 
 




























































Table 3.1 Takeover Target Sample Construction 
 
 
This table provides detailed information on the construction of the takeover target prediction 
sample. All data are from OptionMetrics database. 
 
  Data Filters  Number of firms 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firms with available data from 
OptionMetrics 1996-2006  
5584 
 Firms last throughout the sample period  3508 
 Firms exit the sample due to mergers  1613 
            Firms exit the sample for other reasons  463 
Number of firms with valid cross-matched firm identifiers  5452 
Number of firms with available data in stock/option trading and 
accounting variables  
3868 
 Firms last throughout the sample period  2346 
 Firms exit the sample due to mergers  1295 


































Table 3.2  Cumulative Average Abnormal Trading Volume 
 
This table presents the cumulative average abnormal trading volume 30 days leading up to the 
announcement date. Option volume, separated by calls and puts, are conditioned on option 
moneyness and maturities as well as on underlying stock trading liquidity. For each 
conditioning variable, option volume is computed from three samples: the whole sample, the 
sub sample where there is no media expectation about the merger and the sub sample where 
there are no acquiror's toeholds in target firms. Panel A and Panel B provide the cumulative 
abnormal trading volume for calls and puts respectively, whereas Panel a and Panel b in both 
panels are conditional on option characteristics and stock trading liquidity respectively. All 
numbers reported are statistically significant at one percent level.  
 
Panel A. Call Options 
Panel a. Conditional on Moneyness and Maturity 
 By Moneyness By Maturities 
 ITM ATM OTM Short-Term Long-Term 
All Sample 9.953 13.720 9.880 16.111 9.585 
No Media  8.637 12.559 8.806 14.666 9.307 
No Toe-Hold 10.212 14.218 10.365 16.745 10.350 
Panel b. Conditional on Stock Trading Liquidity 
 Lowest Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Highest 
All Sample 22.967 20.823 14.735 13.332 7.018 
No Media  22.702 17.481 13.543 11.057 5.758 
No Toe-Hold 24.169 22.160 15.276 13.725 7.016 
Panel B. Put Options 
Panel a. Conditional on Moneyness and Maturity 
 By Moneyness By Maturities 
 ITM ATM OTM Short-Term Long-Term 
All Sample 1.451 5.350 5.941 7.211 6.205 
No Media  0.276 6.039 7.010 10.350 6.983 
No Toe-Hold 4.730 3.579 6.324 8.490 1.560 
Panel b. Conditional on Stock Trading Liquidity 
 Lowest Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Highest 
All Sample 8.412 10.019 6.881 7.526 5.903 
No Media  7.792 8.550 6.563 5.598 6.455 




















Table 3.3  Leverage and Liquidity of Different Option Contracts 
 
This table provides the cross-sectional average of proxies for liquidity and leverage for 
options with different maturities and moneyness. Option trading liquidity is proxied by 
natural log of trading volume over [t-240, t-60]. Leverage is proxied by option delta. Panel A 
and Panel B provides the liquidity and leverage characteristics for calls and puts respectively.  
 
Panel A. Call Options 
 By Moneyness By Maturities 
 ITM ATM OTM Short-Term Long-Term 
Liquidity (Log Volume) 1.903 2.565 1.103 2.480 2.178 
Leverage (Delta) 0.302 0.541 0.822 0.493 0.514 
Panel B. Put Options 
 By Moneyness By Maturities 
 ITM ATM OTM Short-Term Long-Term 
Liquidity (Log Volume) 0.950 1.557 0.643 1.487 1.201 












 Table 3.4  Determinants of Abnormal Option Volume 
 
This table examines the determinants of the abnormal trading volume in the options market 
prior to takeover announcements. The regression specification is as follows:  
 
=opt stkCumAbvol Media Toehold StkLiq OrderFlow Volspreadα β γ η ω υ ε+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
Where the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal call option trading volume 30 days 
before the announcement date; Media is an indicator variable that equals to one if there is 
public news report about the merger deal one year prior to the announcement dates. Toehold 
is acquiror's toeholding in the target company prior to merger announcement. StkLiq is stock 
trading liquidity defined as the average of stock trading volume over the benchmark period 
([t-240, t-60]). OrderFlow is the stock market order imbalance defined as buyer-initiated 
volume minus seller-initiated volume over the event period ([t-30, t-1]). Volspread variables 
in model 1 - 6 are cumulative implied volatility spread computed from the whole sample, 
ITM, ATM, OTM, short-term options and long-term options respectively. P-values are 















































































































































Table 3.5  Lead-lag Relationship between Stock Market Order Flow and Relative Option 
Trading Volume  
 
This table presents the test results of the lead-lag relationship between stock market order 
flow and relative option trading volume; Stock market order flow is defined as the buyer-
initiated stock volume minus seller-initiated stock volume, where buy/sell initiation is 
classified using the standard Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. Relative option trading volume 
is computed both by option maturity and option moneyness. For options with different 
maturities, relative option trading volume is defined as short-term volume minus long-term 
volume. For option moneyness, relative option trading volumes are either ATM volume minus 
ITM volume or ATM volume minus OTM volume. Both stock market order flow series and 
relative option trading series are standardized using the mean and standard deviation in the 
benchmark window ([t-150, t-30]). The following pooling regression is then estimated:  
 1 1 2 1= , [ 30, 1]t t tStkVol StkVol OptVol t t tα β β ε− −+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ∈ − −  
where StkVol and OptVol are the stock market order flow and relative option trading volume 
respectively. Panel A provides the regression results for the whole sample whereas Panel B 
and C provides the results for the sub sample where the cumulative implied volatility spread 
is negative and positive respectively. P-values are included in the parentheses. 
 
Panel A. All Sample 
 Short - Long ATM – ITM ATM-OTM 
α  0.065(<.001) 0.067(<.001)  0.044 (<.001)  
1β  
0.089 (<.001) 0.094 (<.001) 0.109 (<.001) 
2β  
0.011 (.009) 0.021 (<.001) 0.014 (<.001) 
Panel B. No Cumulation of Implied Volatility Spread 
 Short - Long ATM – ITM ATM-OTM 
α  0.095 (<.001) 0.105 (<.001) 0.069 (.002) 
1β  
0.143 (<.001) 0.135 (<.001) 0.118( (<.001) 
2β  
0.007 (.244) 0.007 (.189) 0.012 (.013) 
Panel C. Cumulation of Implied Volatility Spread 
 Short - Long ATM – ITM ATM-OTM 
α  0.034 (.088) 0.033 (.118) 0.024 (.175) 
1β  
0.077 (<.001) 0.081 (<.001) 0.110 (<.001) 
2β  















Table 3.6  Option Trading and Pre-Takeover Stock Price Runup 
 
This table examines the informational content of abnormal trading volume in the options 
market prior to takeover announcements. The regression specification is as follows:  
 = stk optPriorRet Media OrderFlow Cumabvolα β γ η ε+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +  
 Where the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return 30 days before the 
announcement date for each merger deal; Media is an indicator variable that equals to one if 
there is public news report about the merger deal one year prior to the announcement dates. 
OrderFlow_stk is the Stock market order flow defined as the buy-initiated volume minus seller-
initiated volume, where buy/seller initiation is classified using the standard Lee and Ready 
(1991) algorithm. Cumabvol_opt are the cumulative abnormal option trading volume 30 days 
prior to the announcement dates. Cumabvol_opt variables in model 1 - 6 are cumulative 
abnormal call option trading volume computed from the whole sample, ITM, ATM, OTM, 
short-term options and long-term options respectively. P-values are presented in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. All 






































































No.of obs 852 845 809 846 848 839 











  Table 3.7  Forecasting Takeover Targets Using Option Trading Volume 
 
This table presents the parameter estimates for the hazard model that forecasts takeover 
targets with a set of time-varying predictors. Sample period is from Jan 1996 to Dec 2006. 
Volume and Openint are the natural logs of the monthly option trading volume and open 
interest respectively computed from OptionMetrics database; Mktcap is the natural log of the 
price multiplied by shares outstanding. Ret is the monthly excess return computed from CRSP; 
Stkvol is the monthly stock trading volume scaled by shares outstanding; Btm is the quarterly 
book-to-market ratio computed from Compustat. Model 1 use the aggregate option trading 
volume whereas in Model 2 to Model 6, trading volume computed from ITM, ATM and OTM, 
short-term and long-term options are used respectively. P-values for the Chi-square test 
statistics are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 
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